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A TORT OF INVASION OF PRIVACY IN AUSTRALIA? 
DES BUTLER∗ 
[Recent decisions in the House of Lords and the New Zealand Court of Appeal have recognised 
forms of protection of personal privacy in the United Kingdom and New Zealand respectively. With 
the High Court clearing the way for the development of such a tort in Australia, this article 
addresses the potential form that such a development could take. The need to take into account 
existing laws, including the constitutional freedom of communication concerning governmental or 
political matters, should result in the development of a tort and corresponding defences which are 
appropriately adapted to an Australian context.] 
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I   INTRODUCTION 
Australia is a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights,1 art 17 of which requires contracting states to ensure that their domestic 
legal systems provide adequate protection against interference with privacy.2 
Although legislation has been enacted at federal and state levels protecting the 
privacy of information3 and communications,4 it has long been asserted that the 
 
 ∗ LLB (Hons), PhD (QUT); Professor, Faculty of Law, Queensland University of Technology. 
 1 Opened for signature 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976). 
 2 See also the recognition of rights to privacy in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA 
Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd plen mtg, art 12, UN Doc A/810 (III) (1948); Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for 
signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 222, art 8 (entered into force 3 September 1953) 
(‘ECHR’). 
 3 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). 
 4 Listening Devices Act 1992 (ACT); Listening Devices Act 1984 (NSW); Surveillance Devices 
Act 2000 (NT); Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld); Listening and Surveillance Devices Act 
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common law of Australia did not recognise an enforceable right to personal 
privacy.5 However, in 2001 the High Court in Australian Broadcasting Corpora-
tion v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd6 rejected this assertion and entertained the 
possibility that the common law might develop to recognise a tort of invasion of 
privacy.7 There have since been mixed messages from lower courts concerning 
the development of the tort in this country, with cases both supporting8 and 
resisting9 its recognition. 
What is it about personal privacy that makes its protection problematic? A 
major difficulty lies in defining what ‘privacy’ means — the concept lacks 
precision.10 An associated problem exists in striking the appropriate balance 
between privacy interests and free speech interests,11 an issue which will involve 
a determination of the nature and scope of appropriate defences, in particular any 
public interest defence. 
This article discusses the possible development of a tort of invasion of privacy 
in Australia. After a brief reference to the views expressed by the High Court in 
Lenah Game Meats, it traces the development of privacy torts in the United 
States, United Kingdom and New Zealand. The article then examines the 
Australian cases subsequent to Lenah Game Meats that have considered privacy, 
before addressing the various live issues that are involved in the recognition of 
the tort, including the scope of the defences. 
II   LENAH GAME MEATS :  THE REMOVAL OF  AN OBSTACLE 
It was long believed that the common law of Australia, like that of the United 
Kingdom, did not recognise a right to privacy. This view was traditionally 
supported by reference to dicta in Victoria Park,12 which concerned an attempt 
by the owner of a racetrack to prevent the defendants from observing and 
broadcasting the races and race information displayed at the track from the 
vantage point of a platform constructed on adjacent land. The plaintiff based its 
claim on various grounds, including nuisance, to which Latham CJ remarked 
 
1972 (SA); Listening Devices Act 1991 (Tas); Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic); Surveillance 
Devices Act 1998 (WA) (‘Listening Devices Acts’). 
 5 Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479, 496 
(Latham CJ), 521 (Evatt J) (‘Victoria Park’). 
 6 (2001) 208 CLR 199 (‘Lenah Game Meats’). 
 7 Ibid 248–9 (Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
 8 Skoien SJDC of the Queensland District Court took the first ‘bold step’ of recognising the tort in 
Grosse v Purvis [2003] Aust Torts Reports ¶81-706, 64 187 (‘Grosse’). Osborn J in Rich-
ards v Victoria [2003] VSC 368 (Unreported, Osborn J, 2 October 2003) was more equivocal. 
 9 Giller v Procopets [2004] VSC 113 (Unreported, Gillard J, 7 April 2004) (‘Giller’); 
Kalaba v Commonwealth [2004] FCA 763 (Unreported, Heerey J, 8 June 2004). Leave to appeal 
was refused on the ground that the case did not sufficiently raise arguments as to whether a tort 
of privacy existed: Kalaba v Commonwealth [2004] FCAFC 326 (Unreported, Tamberlin, North 
and Dowsett JJ, 14 December 2004). 
 10 See Lenah Game Meats (2001) 208 CLR 199, 225–7 (Gleeson CJ). 
 11 Ibid 226. 
 12 See, eg, Cruise v Southdown Press Pty Ltd (1993) 26 IPR 125, 125 (Gray J); Australian 
Consolidated Press Ltd v Ettingshausen (Unreported, New South Wales Court of Appeal, 
Gleeson CJ, Kirby P and Clarke JA, 13 October 1993). 
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‘[h]owever desirable some limitation upon invasions of privacy might be, no 
authority was cited which shows that any general right of privacy exists.’13 
More recently, however, the High Court in Lenah Game Meats rejected the 
assumed authority of the Victoria Park case. Gummow and Hayne JJ (with 
whom Gaudron J agreed) bluntly stated their view that ‘Victoria Park does not 
stand in the path of the development of … a cause of action [for invasion of 
privacy].’14 Kirby J was of a like mind: ‘It may be that more was read into the 
decision in Victoria Park than the actual holding required.’15 Callinan J summed 
up the ‘narrow majority’ decision as being ‘a product of a different time’,16 
which his Honour described as both ‘conservative’ and having ‘the appearance of 
an anachronism’.17 His Honour concluded that the decision in Victoria Park 
clearly had no application in a case of invasion of privacy.18 
Therefore, while Lenah Game Meats swept away a major obstacle to the 
recognition of a right to privacy at common law, most of the judges were content 
to rest at that point. Only Callinan J was prepared to go further and express 
support for the recognition of a right to privacy, at least for the benefit of 
individuals as opposed to corporations: 
It seems to me that, having regard to current conditions in this country, and de-
velopments of the law in other common law jurisdictions, the time is right for 
consideration whether a tort of invasion of privacy should be recognised in this 
country, or whether the legislatures should be left to determine whether provi-
sions for a remedy for it should be made.19 
Thus, while the High Court in Lenah Game Meats did not make the leap to 
recognising a tort for invasion of privacy, it is fair to say that it cleared the way 
for the subsequent development of such a tort. 
I I I   INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
It is instructive to examine the experience in three overseas common law 
jurisdictions, which may influence the future development of a tort of privacy in 
Australia.20 
 
 
 
 
 
 13 Victoria Park (1937) 58 CLR 479, 496. 
 14 (2001) 208 CLR 199, 248. 
 15 Ibid 277. 
 16 Ibid 321. 
 17 Ibid 322. 
 18 Ibid 323–4. 
 19 Ibid 328. 
 20 Protection of privacy is common among civil law Continental countries such as Germany, 
France and Italy: see, eg, Basil Markesinis (ed), Protecting Privacy (1999) chs 2–4. It should be 
noted that a discussion of these laws in the context of the civil law is beyond the scope of this 
article. 
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A  United States: Genesis of the Tort of Invasion of Privacy 
In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published a seminal article21 
which argued that the collection of predominately United Kingdom cases that 
they had assembled22 in fact reflected an intention to protect personal privacy. 
The significance of this ‘right to be left alone’23 was expressed in terms that may 
be considered just as relevant today: 
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety 
and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, 
but has become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery. … 
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, 
have rendered necessary some retreat from the world …24 
The problem, as the authors saw it, was that if the courts continued to rely on 
artificial applications of existing causes of action, they would be unable to deal 
with all instances of breach of privacy.25 This was particularly so considering 
developments in technology, which at the time included the development of 
photography as a tool a stranger could use to surreptitiously invade privacy in 
circumstances beyond the reach of existing causes of action.26 Warren and 
Brandeis sought to ameliorate any fears of a far-reaching doctrine by suggesting 
various limits: that privacy would be trumped if a publication were of public or 
general interest; that publications which would be privileged under defamation 
law would have similar protection against any action for breach of privacy; that, 
like slander, oral breaches of privacy would not be actionable in the absence of 
special damage; and that any right to privacy would cease when the material was 
published by the individual or with his or her consent.27 Although the article 
initially met with a cool reception,28 it inspired recognition of a common law 
right to privacy, first in Georgia29 and then throughout the United States.30 It was 
sufficiently well recognised by 1939 that it had found its way into the Restate-
ment of Torts (1939).31 
 
 21 Samuel D Warren and Louis D Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1890) 4 Harvard Law Review 
193. 
 22 The cases had been decided on such grounds as implied contract law, common law copyright, 
trust and confidentiality, and included: Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 1 Mac & G 25; 41 ER 
1171 (copyright); Abernethy v Hutchinson (1825) 1 H & Tw 28; 47 ER 1313 (confidentiality); 
Pollard v Photographic Co (1888) 40 Ch D 345 (implied contract). 
 23 Raymond Wacks, ‘The Poverty of “Privacy”’ (1980) 96 Law Quarterly Review 73, 78. 
 24 Warren and Brandeis, above n 21, 196. 
 25 Ibid 211–12. 
 26 Ibid 211. 
 27 Ibid 214, 216–18. 
 28 Roberson v Rochester Folding Box Co, 171 NY 538 (1902), later effectively overturned by 
statutes making invasion of privacy both a tort and a misdemeanour: 1903 NY Laws 132 §§ 1–2, 
now replaced by NY Civ Rights Law §§ 50–1 (2000). 
 29 Pavesich v New England Life Insurance Co, 122 Ga 190 (1905). 
 30 Restatement of Torts § 867 (1939). Today, most, if not all, United States jurisdictions have 
acknowledged a common law right to privacy in one form or another: Geoff Dendy, ‘The News-
worthiness Defense to the Public Disclosure Tort’ (1996) 85 Kentucky Law Journal 147, 147. 
 31 Warren and Brandeis’ article has been lauded as ‘perhaps the most influential law journal piece 
ever published’: P Allan Dionisopoulos and Craig R Ducat, The Right to Privacy: Essays and 
Cases (1976) 20. 
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Seventy years after Warren and Brandeis’ article was published, William 
Prosser reviewed the body of cases protecting privacy32 and suggested that they 
in fact represented four separate torts: unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion 
of another, public disclosure of private facts, displaying another in a false light 
before the public, and appropriation of another’s name or likeness.33 This 
four-way formulation gained judicial acceptance,34 and in 1977 was adopted in 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A (1977) (‘Second Restatement’). This 
section refers to four specific components,35 which provide that liability for 
invasion of privacy arises where one person: 
1 intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion 
of another (either as to person or private affairs or concerns) if the intrusion 
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities: 
§ 652B; 
2 appropriates to his or her own use or benefit the name or likeness of another: 
§ 652C; 
3 gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another which is 
matter of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and 
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public: § 652D; or 
4 gives publicity to a matter concerning another which places that person 
before the public in a false light where (a) that false light would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person and (b) the publisher knew of or recklessly 
disregarded the falsity of the matter and the false light in which the other 
would be placed: § 652E. 
The Second Restatement states that all four instances of invasion of privacy are 
subject to the same absolute privilege defences that apply to defamation, 
including parliamentary (legislative) and court privilege and consent,36 as well as 
conditional privileges (such as reports of public proceedings, executive officers 
performing official duties, protection of defendants’ interests, reports to govern-
ment authorities concerning mental health, and reasonable investigation of a 
claim against the defendant).37 
These torts have enjoyed a less than spectacular existence. The unreasonable 
intrusion tort, for example, was recognised in almost all jurisdictions; however, 
until recently it had proved to be ‘toothless’ against media defendants in particu-
 
 32 William L Prosser, ‘Privacy’ (1960) 48 California Law Review 383. 
 33 Ibid 389–407. 
 34 The views of Warren and Brandeis were first accepted by the Georgia Supreme Court in 
Pavesich v New England Life Insurance Co, 122 Ga 190 (1905). The United States Supreme 
Court has also approved the arguments in the article: see Time Inc v Hill, 385 US 374, 383 
(Brennan J) (1967); Cox Broadcasting Corporation v Cohn, 420 US 469, 488 (White J) (1975). 
 35 The Second Restatement makes it clear that the four forms of invasion of privacy are the ones 
that crystallised in a majority of states. There is nothing preventing another form being recog-
nised at some time in the future: Second Restatement § 652A cmt c (1977). It should also be 
noted that the formulations in the Second Restatement reflect the more common formulations. 
Differences in formulation may appear in some jurisdictions. 
 36 Second Restatement § 652F (1977). 
 37 Second Restatement § 652G (1977). See also § 890 concerning privileges. 
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lar, with few surviving motions for summary judgment.38 The United States 
Supreme Court has held that intrusive newsgathering is ‘not without its First 
Amendment protections’ as an essential antecedent to publication.39 At the same 
time, American courts have maintained that it does not provide the news media 
with general immunity during newsgathering: ‘[t]he First Amendment is not a 
license to trespass, to steal, or to intrude by electronic means into the precincts of 
another’s home or office.’40 More recently, the courts have indicated that the 
balance may have tipped against intrusive newsgathering and in favour of 
privacy.41 Intrusion no longer needs to be upon ‘seclusion’, and may be in 
semi-private places like restaurants42 or workplaces.43 Further, it has been 
recognised that intrusion need not be physical and may be by electronic means.44 
By contrast, the courts have been more willing to uphold First Amendment 
rights in preference to preventing an invasion of privacy in the form of the public 
disclosure of private facts. The elements of this tort are not uniform in all 
jurisdictions, but the Second Restatement § 652D represents a typical formula-
tion. ‘Newsworthiness’ and consent are the principal defences. 
Another formulation of this tort that has wide support is that of Prosser and 
Keeton: (a) a public disclosure; (b) of private facts; (c) that is highly offensive to 
a reasonable person; and (d) is not newsworthy.45 Courts have interpreted the 
‘newsworthiness’ defence increasingly widely.46 These interpretations have 
included: 
• determining what is of legitimate public concern by distinguishing between 
information to which the public is entitled and information that would not be 
the concern of a reasonable member of the community with decent stan-
dards;47 
• requiring the information to be of public interest and ‘decent’, together with a 
logical nexus between the complainant and the matter of public interest;48 
• taking into account the social value of the information, the depth of the 
intrusion into private areas and the extent to which the complainant has 
 
 38 Jennifer Marmon, ‘Intrusion and the Media: An Old Tort Learns New Tricks’ (2000) 34 Indiana 
Law Review 155, 164. In the period 1986–96, nearly 90 per cent of intrusion claims were dis-
missed on summary judgment, possibly due to being pleaded in the alternative: Lyrissa Barnett 
Lidsky, ‘Prying, Spying, and Lying: Intrusive Newsgathering and What the Law Should Do 
about It’ (1998) 73 Tulane Law Review 173, 207–8. 
 39 Branzburg v Hayes, 408 US 665, 707 (White J) (1972). 
 40 Dietemann v Time Inc, 449 F 2d 245, 249 (Hufstedler J) (9th Cir, 1971).  
 41 Wilson v Layne, 526 US 603 (1999) (media ‘riding along’ with police while executing an arrest 
warrant). 
 42 Stessman v American Black Hawk Broadcasting Co, 416 NW 2d 685 (Iowa, 1987). 
 43 Sanders v American Broadcasting Companies Inc, 978 P 2d 67 (Cal, 1999), review denied 2000 
Cal LEXIS 1892 (Cal, 2000). 
 44 See, eg, Miller v National Broadcasting Co, 187 Cal App 3d 1463 (1986). 
 45 William Prosser and W Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (5th ed, 1984)  
856–7. 
 46 Ibid. 
 47 Virgil v Time Inc, 527 F 2d 1122, 1129 (Merrill J) (9th Cir, 1975). 
 48 Campbell v Seabury Press, 614 F 2d 395 (5th Cir, 1980); Gilbert v Medical Economics Co, 665 
F 2d 305, 308–9 (McKay J) (10th Cir, 1981). 
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placed himself or herself in the public eye, subject to the information being 
‘decent’;49 
• leaving it to the media to decide whether the facts are newsworthy;50 and 
• viewing all publications as newsworthy by not recognising a tort of public 
disclosure of private facts.51 
By regarding the First Amendment as an effective trump factor in many if not 
most cases,52 the tort of disclosure of private facts has been described as having 
been rendered ‘effectively impotent.’53 One commentator has attributed the 
ineffectiveness of the tort to ‘social changes in the relationships between the 
individual and others, evolution in social values, and profound shifts in the 
nature, function, and organization of public communication.’54 
B  United Kingdom: Metamorphosis of a Cause of Action 
In Kaye v Robertson,55 a journalist and a photographer gained access to a 
hospital room where a television star was recuperating from serious head injuries 
(sustained when he was struck by a tree branch in a storm). He had no memory 
of the events and was not in any state to either consent to an interview or to 
having his photograph taken.56 The star sought to restrain publication based on a 
range of causes of action, including trespass to the person, defamation, passing 
off and malicious falsehood.57 There was no attempt to rely on breach of 
confidence, most likely on the basis that the journalist could not be under an 
obligation of confidence in the circumstances. In the course of upholding an 
interlocutory injunction, on the ground that it was a malicious falsehood to claim 
that the plaintiff had given his consent, the English Court of Appeal made it clear 
that the English common law did not recognise a right to privacy, and that this 
could only be done by the legislature and not by the courts. Bingham LJ re-
marked that: 
 
 49 Briscoe v Reader’s Digest Association Inc, 483 P 2d 34 (Cal, 1971). 
 50 As first described in Diane L Zimmerman, ‘Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren 
and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort’ (1983) 68 Cornell Law Review 291, 353–5. See, eg, Jenkins v Dell 
Publishing Co, 251 F 2d 447 (3rd Cir, 1958), cert denied 357 US 921 (1958); Howard v Des 
Moines Register & Tribune Co, 283 NW 2d 289, 302 (McCormick J) (Iowa, 1979), cert denied 
445 US 904 (1980). 
 51 See, eg, Hall v Post, 372 SE 2d 711, 714 (Mitchell J) (NC, 1988). 
 52 Zimmerman, above n 50, 311. 
 53 Campbell v Seabury Press 614 F 2d 395, 397 (The Court) (5th Cir, 1980). See also Harry Kalven 
Jr, ‘Privacy in Tort Law — Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?’ (1966) 31 Law and Contempo-
rary Problems 326, 336: ‘the claim of [newsworthiness] is … so overpowering as virtually to 
swallow the tort.’ 
 54 Randall P Bezanson, ‘The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News and Social Change  
1890–1990’ (1992) 80 California Law Review 1133, 1173. See also Randall P Bezanson, Gilbert 
Cranberg and John Soloski, Libel Law and the Press: Myth and Reality (1987) 97, 115–18, 
summarising an empirical study which showed that plaintiffs won less than three per cent of 
public disclosure cases. 
 55 (1990) 19 IPR 147 (‘Kaye’). 
 56 Ibid 149 (Glidewell LJ). 
 57 Ibid 150. 
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This case none the less highlights, yet again, the failure of both the common 
law of England and statute to protect in an effective way the personal privacy 
of individual citizens. … The defendant’s conduct towards the plaintiff here 
was ‘a monstrous invasion of his privacy’ … If ever a person has a right to be 
let alone by strangers with no public interest to pursue, it must surely be when 
he lies in hospital recovering from brain surgery and in no more than partial 
command of his faculties. It is this invasion of his privacy which underlies the 
plaintiff’s complaint. Yet it alone, however gross, does not entitle him to relief 
in English law.58 
A catalyst for change since the Kaye decision has been the enactment of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) c 42 (‘HRA’), which requires English courts to 
take the ECHR into account when making determinations.59 Article 8 of the 
ECHR provides a ‘right to respect for… private and family life, … home and … 
correspondence.’ 
A further sign of change came with the decision of the European Commission 
of Human Rights in Earl Spencer v United Kingdom,60 a case arising from press 
reports concerning bulimia and mental health problems experienced by Countess 
Spencer, including photographs taken at a private clinic by means of a telephoto 
lens. The European Commission of Human Rights ruled that English law had no 
need for a distinct privacy tort to grant a remedy, because the action for breach of 
confidence could be developed to embrace cases involving invasions of pri-
vacy.61 
The elements of the action were usefully summarised in Coco v A N Clark 
(Engineers) Ltd,62 a trade secrets case, as follows: 
1 the information must have the necessary quality of confidence; 
2 the information must have been imparted in circumstances importing an 
obligation of confidence; and 
3 there must be an actual or threatened unauthorised use or disclosure of the 
information to the detriment of the confider.63 
Two significant developments in the law concerning breach of confidence 
have helped to facilitate its use in relation to personal privacy. The first was the 
finding that the requirement that the information have the necessary quality of 
confidence was not limited to trade or business information, but could include 
personal information.64 At first this meant the secrets of a marital relationship.65 
The marital relationship was well-recognised and well-defined, involving mutual 
 
 58 Ibid 154. 
 59 HRA s 2(1). See Gavin Phillipson and Helen Fenwick, ‘Breach of Confidence as a Privacy 
Remedy in the Human Rights Act Era’ (2000) 63 Modern Law Review 660, especially 664–70; 
Rabinder Singh, ‘Privacy and the Media after the Human Rights Act’ [1998] European Human 
Rights Law Review 712. 
 60 (1998) 25 EHRR CD 105. 
 61 Ibid 117–18. 
 62 [1969] RPC 41 (‘Coco’). 
 63 Ibid 47 (Megarry J). 
 64 Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 1 Mac & G 25; 41 ER 1171. 
 65 Duchess of Argyll v Duke of Argyll [1967] Ch 302. 
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trust and confidence, and a clear policy could be discerned to protect such 
confidentiality with the object of preserving the relationship. 
However, the category of relevant relationships was then extended to include 
those involving a sexual relationship.66 As one judge observed: ‘To most people 
the details of their sexual lives are high on their list of those matters which they 
regard as confidential. The mere fact that two people know a secret does not 
mean that it is not confidential.’67 The relevant information only ceased to be 
capable of protection as confidential when it was in fact known to a substantial 
number of people.68 Thus, while the nature of the information was important, the 
category of personal relationship was now left open-ended and was no longer a 
relevant factor.69 The information could now be judged confidential, even where 
the parties were friends, enemies or strangers, if the relationship involved shared 
information that was deemed to be confidential, such as details of sexual 
relations. 
The second development lay in the equitable recognition that the obligation of 
confidence is not restricted to the original confidante, but may also extend to 
third parties in whose hands the confidential information may come to reside.70 
A duty of confidence may arise whenever a third party receives information in 
circumstances in which he or she either knows, or ought to know, that the 
information is subject to a duty of confidence.71 For example, the third party 
might know that the information is received in breach of a duty of confidence, or 
received in ‘certain circumstances, beloved of law teachers’, such as where an 
obviously confidential document is wafted by an electric fan into a crowded 
street or dropped in a public place.72 
Accordingly, the doctrine may extend to actual or intended disclosure by third 
parties such as the media. Thus, courts have been prepared to act where the 
media had surreptitiously acquired information that it knew or ought to have 
known was held secret. This was shown in two cases involving photographers 
gaining access to restricted areas in order to obtain photographs of people or 
scenes that others wanted to keep confidential.73 In both cases, the court referred 
to the surreptitious conduct of the photographer as indicative of his knowledge 
that the information being acquired was confidential.74 The notion of the 
 
 66 Stephens v Avery [1988] Ch 449 (claimant communicated information concerning her lesbian 
relationship with a married woman to the defendant). See also Barrymore v News Group News-
papers Ltd [1997] FSR 600, 602 (Jacob J) (married man’s homosexual partner released details of 
their affair to newspaper). 
 67 Stephens v Avery [1988] Ch 449, 454 (Browne-Wilkinson V-C). 
 68 Ibid. 
 69 Ibid. 
 70 See, eg, Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457, 464 (Lord Nicholls) (‘Campbell’). 
 71 A-G (UK) v Guardian Newspapers Ltd [No 2] [1990] 1 AC 109, 281 (Lord Goff). 
 72 Ibid. 
 73 Shelley Films Ltd v Rex Features Ltd [1994] EMLR 134 (access to a film set to photograph the 
set and actors in costume); Creation Records Ltd v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1997] EMLR 
444 (access to a hotel being used as the location for a photo shoot of an album cover). 
 74 Shelley Films Ltd v Rex Features Ltd [1994] EMLR 134, 148–9 (Mann QC); Creation Records 
Ltd v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1997] EMLR 444, 455 (Lloyd J). 
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surreptitious conduct being indicative of a breach of confidentiality then came to 
be equated with privacy: 
If someone with a telephoto lens were to take from a distance and with no au-
thority a picture of another engaged in some private act, his subsequent disclo-
sure of the photograph would … surely amount to a breach of confidence as if 
he had found or stolen a letter or diary in which the act was recounted and pro-
ceeded to publish it.75 
In so doing, the law protected what might be called a right to privacy, although 
the name given to the cause of action was breach of confidence.76 
The emphasis, therefore, had shifted from the obligation of confidence, repre-
sented by the second element in the Coco formulation, to the nature of the 
information and the means by which it had been obtained. 
Perhaps the closest the United Kingdom has come to the recognition of a right 
to privacy per se was the appeal against an interlocutory injunction in Doug-
las v Hello! Ltd.77 The case concerned photographs taken surreptitiously at the 
wedding of actors Michael Douglas and Catherine Zeta-Jones. An exclusivity 
deal covering photographs had been reached with a magazine, and great care was 
taken in warning guests and others that unauthorised photography was not 
permitted. An interlocutory injunction was granted to restrain a rival magazine 
from publishing the photographs.78 On appeal, Sedley LJ went so far as to 
suggest that United Kingdom law should now recognise a right to privacy: ‘The 
law no longer needs to construct an artificial relationship of confidentiality 
between intruder and victim: it can recognise privacy itself as a legal principle 
drawn from the fundamental value of personal autonomy.’79 
The other members of the Court of Appeal did not agree. Brooke LJ thought 
that the claim to privacy was not a strong one,80 and that instead the claimants 
were likely to establish that the publication should not be allowed on the grounds 
of confidentiality.81 Keene LJ thought that whether a liability was described as 
being a breach of confidence or as a breach of a right to privacy might be little 
more than deciding what label was to be attached to the cause of action.82 At the 
eventual trial, the case was decided on the basis of the commercial value of the 
photographs to the media.83 The elaborate steps taken to exclude unauthorised 
photography meant that the photographs had been acquired by the defendant in 
 
 75 Hellewell v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [1995] 4 All ER 473, 476 (Laws J). 
 76 Ibid. 
 77 [2001] QB 967. 
 78 Douglas v Hello! Ltd (Unreported, High Court of Justice of England and Wales, Queen’s Bench 
Division, Buckley J, 20 November 2000). The injunction was continued following a contested 
hearing: Douglas v Hello! Ltd (Unreported, High Court of Justice of England and Wales, 
Queen’s Bench Division, Hunt J, 21 November 2000). 
 79 Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2001] QB 967, 1001. 
 80 Ibid 995. 
 81 Ibid. 
 82 Ibid 1012. 
 83 Douglas v Hello! Ltd [No 3] [2003] 3 All ER 996. 
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circumstances in which they knew or ought to have known that they were subject 
to an obligation of confidence.84 
Statements in two recent cases indicate how far the United Kingdom cases 
have moved from the original rationale of the action for breach of confidence as 
a doctrine binding the conscience of a confidante who is subject to an obligation 
of confidentiality. In Venables v News Group Newspapers Ltd,85 the claimants, 
Jon Venables and Robert Thompson, were the notorious 10-year-old murderers 
of toddler James Bulger. The court held that they were to be released from 
custody when they turned 18. The plaintiffs sought to prevent the defendant 
newspapers from disclosing information as to their identity and whereabouts.86 It 
was held that the right to confidence protecting against the disclosure of their 
identity should be placed above the right of the media to freedom of expression, 
due to the risk to the claimants’ lives.87 Butler-Sloss P held that the protection of 
confidential information could be extended, even if it meant imposing restric-
tions on the press, ‘where not to do so would be likely to lead to the serious 
physical injury, or to the death, of the person seeking that confidentiality, and 
there is no other way to protect the applicants’.88 
The other case, A v B plc,89 concerned a married professional footballer who 
had had sexual relations with two women, following which the two women took 
their story to a newspaper. In the absence of an express agreement to keep the 
affairs confidential, the question arose as to whether confidentiality could be 
used as a basis for an injunction restraining publication of the story. In the course 
of setting aside an injunction, the English Court of Appeal promulgated a series 
of guidelines designed to allow judges to decide similar applications without 
being hampered by debate over the relevant authorities.90 These guidelines 
acknowledged the particular importance of freedom of the press. They also 
provided that ‘[a] duty of confidence will arise whenever the party subject to the 
duty is in a situation where he either knows or ought to know that the other 
person can reasonably expect his privacy to be protected.’91 In the case at hand, 
it was held that the degree of confidentiality to which A was entitled was very 
modest.92 The sexual relations here were part of non-permanent relationships 
outside marriage with women who did not want their relationships to remain 
confidential.93 
 
 84 As such, the case was on par with Shelley Films Ltd v Rex Features Ltd [1994] EMLR 134; 
Creation Records Ltd v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1997] EMLR 444. 
 85 [2001] Fam 430 (‘Venables’). 
 86 Ibid 440 (Butler-Sloss P). 
 87 Ibid 466–7. 
 88 Ibid 462. 
 89 [2003] QB 195. 
 90 Ibid 204–10 (Lord Woolf CJ). 
 91 Ibid 207 (citations omitted). 
 92 Ibid 217. 
 93 See also Theakston v MGN Ltd [2002] EMLR 398, 418 (Ouseley J), suggesting that sexual 
relations within marriage at home would be at one end of the spectrum and would be protected 
from most disclosures, in contrast to a one-night stand with a recent acquaintance at a hotel, or a 
transitory engagement in a brothel, which would be yet further away. 
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The Court of Appeal also made this curious observation: 
It is most unlikely that any purpose will be served by a judge seeking to decide 
whether there exists a new cause of action in tort which protects privacy. In the 
great majority of situations, if not all situations, where the protection of privacy 
is justified … an action for breach of confidence now will, where this is appro-
priate, provide the necessary protection. This means that at first instance it can  
be readily accepted that it is not necessary to tackle the vexed question of 
whether there is a separate cause of action based upon a new tort involving the 
infringement of privacy.94 
Behind this ‘vexed question’, however, lurk some issues of importance, includ-
ing the kind and extent of publication that is protected, the legitimacy of award-
ing compensatory damages for breach, and whether other kinds of damages are 
suitable. 
Breach of confidentiality in the United Kingdom has therefore migrated away 
from an obligation of confidence to being a doctrine based on the surreptitious 
means of acquiring private information, thus extending to situations where 
either: 
1 disclosure would be likely to lead to serious physical injury or death of the 
claimant, and seeking relief from the court is the only way of protecting the 
claimant; or 
2 one person knows or ought to know that another person reasonably expects 
his or her privacy to be respected. 
Ground 1 may be explained as merely an instance of an application of ground 2. 
After confirming that United Kingdom law does not recognise a generalised 
tort of infringement of privacy,95 the House of Lords had the opportunity to 
consider a privacy claim based on breach of confidence in Campbell. The 
defendant newspaper published articles which stated, contrary to her previous 
false assertions, that supermodel Naomi Campbell was a drug addict and that she 
was attending meetings of Narcotics Anonymous to beat her addiction. Some 
details of those meetings were published together with photographs of her 
leaving a meeting in Chelsea. The House of Lords found in favour of the plaintiff 
by a 3:2 majority, although this split was based on the facts rather than the 
applicable law. None of the Law Lords questioned the use of the extended action 
for breach of confidence as the appropriate means of obtaining redress for 
invasion of privacy in the form of disclosure of private information. However, 
the nomenclature ‘breach of confidence’ was now described as misleading, as the 
label ‘harks back to the time when the cause of action was based on improper use 
of information disclosed by one person to another in confidence’.96 The ‘capac-
ity of the common law to adapt’ to contemporary life had seen the development 
of the action under two influences: ‘acknowledgement of the artificiality of 
 
 94 [2003] QB 195, 205–6 (Lord Woolf CJ). 
 95 See Wainwright v Home Office [2004] 2 AC 406, 424 (Lord Hoffman), in which no claim was 
recognised for a prison strip search. Cf R v Khan (Sultan) [1997] AC 558, where the Law Lords 
considered the issue without reaching a concluded view. 
 96 [2004] 2 AC 457, 464 (Lord Nicholls). 
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distinguishing between confidential information obtained through the violation 
of a confidential relationship and similar information obtained in some other 
way’, and the influence of the ECHR.97 As Lord Hope remarked, the language 
changed following the commencement of the HRA and the incorporation into 
United Kingdom domestic law of arts 8 and 10 of the ECHR, which recognise 
the right to respect for private life and the right to freedom of expression 
respectively. Instead of the three elements stated in Coco and the public interest 
defence: 
We now talk about the right to respect for private life and the countervailing 
right to freedom of expression … It seems to me that the balancing exercise to 
which that guidance is directed is essentially the same exercise, although it is 
plainly now more carefully focussed and more penetrating.98 
Lord Nicholls suggested that ‘[t]he essence of the tort’ would today be better 
summed up by the label ‘misuse of private information’.99 
The exercise now commences with determining whether the person publishing 
the information knows or ought to know that there is a reasonable expectation 
that the information in question will be kept confidential.100 Once this threshold 
test of what is ‘private’ is satisfied, ‘the court must balance the claimant’s 
interest in keeping the information private against the countervailing interest of 
the recipient in publishing it’.101 In so doing, it is recognised that the importance 
of free expression may mean that very often the countervailing rights of the 
recipient will prevail over those of the subject.102 In the process a measure of 
latitude is demanded by the ‘practical exigencies of journalism’103 and the need 
to allow the press to deal with a legitimate story in its own way.104 As Lord 
Hoffmann remarked, ‘[e]ditorial decisions have to be made quickly and with less 
information than is available to a court which afterwards reviews the matter at 
leisure.’105 
It was acknowledged that the balancing exercise is a matter of fact and degree 
capable of leading different people to different conclusions.106 Their Lordships 
rejected the test of Gleeson CJ in Lenah Game Meats: that what was ‘highly 
offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities’ was indicative of what 
was to be considered private.107 This test was seen as indicating the proportional-
ity of the expectation instead of a balancing of privacy against free expression.108 
 
 97 Ibid 472 (Lord Hoffmann). 
 98 Ibid 480. 
 99 Ibid 465. 
100 Ibid 466 (Lord Nicholls), 480 (Lord Hope). Baroness Hale echoed these sentiments, citing A v B 
plc [2003] QB 195 and Venables [2001] Fam 430: at 495. 
101 Ibid 496 (Baroness Hale). 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid 475 (Lord Hoffman). 
104 Ibid 468 (Lord Nicholls), 475 (Lord Hoffmann). Cf at 489 (Lord Hope), 502 (Baroness Hale). 
See also below n 327 and accompanying text. 
105 Ibid 475. See also 491 (Lord Hope), 504–5 (Lord Carswell). 
106 Ibid 504 (Lord Carswell). 
107 Ibid 466 (Lord Nicholls), 482–3 (Lord Hope), 495–6 (Baroness Hale), 504 (Lord Carswell). 
108 Ibid 466 (Lord Nicholls), 483 (Lord Hope), 496 (Baroness Hale). 
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The English courts have therefore completed a transformation from an equita-
ble breach of confidence to an action for breach of confidence which equates to 
invasion of privacy. This transformation has received support.109 However, it is 
not without conceptual difficulties. Little attention seems to have been focused 
on the legitimacy of the theoretical transformation of an equitable doctrine, 
based on a confidante’s obligations of good conscience and for which an 
injunction is the major discretionary remedy, into what is studiously referred to 
by several judges as the ‘action’ for breach of confidence but which is evidently 
a tort protecting an aspect of human dignity, the major remedy for which is 
substantive damages.110 Indeed, the Court of Appeal has suggested that there is 
little, if any, purpose in judges who are determining urgent applications for 
interlocutory injunctions to consider this ‘vexed question’.111 
The mere fact that something is private does not make it confidential.112 Diffi-
culties may also result from any residual elements of confidentiality when 
applied to the privacy context.113 If the claimant were still required to show an 
obligation of confidence, then a privacy claim could be rejected on the ground of 
the defendant’s reasonable ignorance.114 Confidentiality should not protect 
publication of any images of a person in a public place, since such information 
would not have the necessary quality of confidence.115 Moreover, once informa-
tion has reached the public domain, no action for confidentiality should remain 
regardless of how private the information may be. Finally, the action for breach 
of confidence goes nowhere in correcting the deficiency in the common law 
identified in Kaye concerning unreasonable intrusions.116 
C  New Zealand: Protection of Private Facts 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) s 14 (‘Bill of Rights’) recog-
nises a right to free speech but not a right to privacy. Nevertheless, a number of 
lower court decisions have favoured developing the common law to recognise an 
action for public disclosure of private facts, along the same lines as that available 
in the United States.117 
 
109 See, eg, Phillipson and Fenwick, above n 59. 
110 A common approach has been to merely cite the dicta of Lord Goff in A-G (UK) v Guardian 
Newspapers Ltd [No 2] [1990] 1 AC 109, 281 as recognising that no pre-existing relationship of 
confidence is now required and acknowledging the influence of the HRA. Cf Lord Hoffmann’s 
discussion of the ‘shift in the centre of gravity of the action for breach of confidence’ in Camp-
bell [2004] 2 AC 457, 471–3. Even his Lordship steered clear of discussing the various implica-
tions for the development of the law on the ground that the case at hand ‘fits squarely within 
both the old and new law’: at 473. 
111 A v B plc [2003] QB 195, 205–6 (Lord Woolf CJ). 
112 Raymond Wacks, ‘Breach of Confidence and the Protection of Privacy’ (1977) 127 New Law 
Journal 328, 328. 
113 Rabinder Singh and James Strachan, ‘The Right to Privacy in English Law’ [2002] European 
Human Rights Law Review 129, 155. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Jonathan Morgan, ‘Privacy, Confidence and Horizontal Effect: “Hello” Trouble’ (2003) 62 
Cambridge Law Journal 444, 457. 
116 Ibid. 
117 See Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd [1986] 2 NZLR 716 (‘Tucker’) (the plaintiff conducted 
a fundraising campaign for a heart operation and sought to prevent publication of certain private 
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In the course of these decisions, one judge remarked that ‘a person who lives 
an ordinary private life has a right to be left alone and to live the private aspects 
of his life without being subjected to unwarranted, or undesired, publicity or 
public disclosure.’118 Another judge observed that while the United States had a 
constitutional context that did not apply in New Zealand, ‘the good sense and 
social desirability of the protective principles enunciated are compelling.’119 
The issue was brought to a head in March 2004 in Hosking v Runting,120 which 
concerned an attempt by a television personality and his wife to restrain a 
magazine from publishing photographs of their 18-month-old twins. The Court 
of Appeal, sitting as a five-member bench, held by a narrow 3:2 majority that the 
tort of invasion of privacy should be recognised as forming part of the law of 
New Zealand. 
The leading judgment was the joint judgment of Gault P and Blanchard J. 
Their Honours noted an impetus for change based on international concern for 
human rights. Further, the law governing liability for causing harm to others 
‘necessarily must move to accommodate developments in technology and 
changes in attitudes, practices and values in society.’121 While such changes in 
the law were mainly effected by legislation following extensive enquiry and 
consultation, on occasion courts were called upon to decide a case where the 
current law did not point clearly to an answer and the law had to be developed to 
do justice between the parties.122 Their Honours noted that the cases to date in 
New Zealand had not sought to develop a general law of invasion of privacy. In 
recognising a claim only in cases of public disclosure of private facts, their 
Honours thought that the New Zealand cases were in effect very close to the 
position in the United Kingdom; except that in that jurisdiction the matter had 
been dealt with by way of an extension to the action for breach of confidence, 
rather than as a separate head of liability.123 
The absence of a broad right to privacy in the Bill of Rights did not prevent the 
courts from the incremental development of protection of aspects of privacy in 
appropriate circumstances.124 Further, the protection in current legislation was 
 
details, including criminal convictions; an interim injunction was granted but later lifted when it 
was shown that the convictions were in the public domain); P v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591 (a public 
figure was granted an injunction to restrain publication of a newspaper story that revealed that 
he had been treated in a psychiatric hospital and that he had been attended to by police in an 
emergency medical situation); L v G [2002] NZAR 495 (damages were awarded where a client 
took sexually explicit photographs of a prostitute and then had one of them published in an adult 
magazine without the prostitute’s consent). Cf Bradley v Wingnut Films Ltd [1993] 1 NZLR 415, 
425 (a ‘splatter’ film filmed near a gravesite was not a breach of privacy because the information 
on the tombstone was not private information and the filming was not ‘highly offensive and 
objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities’ in the absence of any overt link 
between the film and the gravesite). 
118 Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd (Unreported, High Court of New Zealand, Jeffries J, 20 
October 1986), as cited in Tucker [1986] 2 NZLR 716, 731 (McGrechan J). 
119 Tucker [1986] 2 NZLR 716, 733 (McGrechan J). 
120 [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (‘Hosking’). 
121 Ibid 5. 
122 Ibid 5–6. 
123 Ibid 6; see also 60 (Tipping J). 
124 Ibid 27 (Gault P and Blanchard J). 
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limited and specifically focused.125 While the Bill of Rights does make freedom 
of speech legally enforceable, freedom of speech was never intended to be 
absolute.126 
The joint judgment endorsed two ‘fundamental requirements’ for a successful 
claim of interference with privacy: 
1 The existence of facts in respect of which there is a reasonable expectation 
of privacy; and 
2 Publicity given to those private facts that would be considered highly 
offensive to an objective reasonable person.127 
The boundaries of this protection would be worked out through future deci-
sions.128 It was also unnecessary to decide whether the other three aspects of 
privacy identified by Prosser, including unreasonable intrusion into solitude or 
seclusion, should be recognised.129 
While Gault P and Blanchard J saw private facts as being those known to some 
people but not the world at large (and for this reason bearing some similarity to 
information having the quality of confidence), their Honours acknowledged that 
there was no simple test of what constituted a ‘private fact’.130 Further, the 
‘highly offensive to the reasonable person’ test — applied to the publicity 
requirement rather than the determination of what is private131 — was seen as an 
appropriate prerequisite so that revelation of mere trifling details would not 
sound in a remedy.132 Additionally, there needed to be widespread publicity as 
opposed to a technical publication, which is sufficient in defamation.133 More-
over, the cause of action was based on humiliation, distress or loss of dignity. As 
such, no personal injury, including recognised psychiatric injury or economic 
loss, was necessary.134 
Their Honours saw a legitimate public concern as an appropriate defence, with 
the defendant bearing the onus of proof. It was thought ‘more conceptually 
sound’ to cast legitimate public concern as a defence, rather than as an element 
of the tort.135 As a defence it was also analogous to the public interest defence to 
breach of confidence in the United Kingdom. A defence of legitimate public 
concern would mean that judges could determine the appropriate balance, in the 
circumstances being considered, between freedom of expression and the plain-
 
125 Ibid 30, referring to, eg, Privacy Act 1993 (NZ) (privacy of information: no civil liability); 
Broadcasting Act 1993 (NZ) (‘privacy of individuals’: no definition and no civil liability for 
breaches); Harassment Act 1997 (NZ) (fears for safety caused by another’s harassing behaviour: 
criminal sanctions but no civil remedies). 
126 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1, 31 (Gault P and Blanchard J). 
127 Ibid 32. This was therefore akin to the formulation of the tort in the Second Restatement. 
128 Ibid. 
129 As done in Bradley v Wingnut Films Ltd [1993] 1 NZLR 415. 
130 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1, 32. 
131 Cf Lenah Game Meats (2001) 208 CLR 199, 226 (Gleeson CJ). 
132 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1, 35. 
133 Ibid 34–5. 
134 Ibid 35. 
135 See Prosser and Keeton, above n 45, 856–7, and as adopted in the Second Restatement 
formulation. 
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tiff’s right to privacy. Thus, where there was a risk of serious injury, as in 
Venables, a ‘very considerable level’ of legitimate public concern would be 
required to outweigh it.136 The deliberate use of the term public concern was 
intended to exclude information which was merely of interest to the public. 
The joint judgment saw no need for special attitudes to public figures and their 
families,137 unlike the position taken in the Second Restatement.138 Instead, it 
was merely recognised that in the case of a public figure, the reasonable 
expectation of privacy in relation to many areas of life will be correspondingly 
reduced as public status increases.139 Involuntary public figures may also 
experience a lessening of expectations of privacy, but not ordinarily to the extent 
of those who willingly put themselves in the spotlight.140 Further, the two 
protection criteria were considered to provide adequate flexibility to protect the 
privacy of families of public figures and to accommodate for the special vulner-
ability of children.141 This includes what is considered to be a legitimate public 
concern that outweighs the right to privacy in circumstances in which there is 
evidence of a risk of personal injury.142 In Hosking there was no evidence of 
such risk. The photographs did not reveal any details with respect to which there 
could be a reasonable expectation of privacy. Publication of the photos also 
would not have been considered highly offensive to a reasonable person. 
The third member of the majority, Tipping J, indicated ‘general agreement’ 
with the joint judgment.143 However, despite professing a desire to make the law 
‘as simple and easy of application as possible in the interests of those who have 
to make decisions about what and what not to publish’,144 his Honour’s summary 
of the tort does not exactly coincide with that of the joint judgment. His Hon-
our’s formulation of the tort was as follows: 
• publication of information or material with respect to which the plaintiff had 
a reasonable expectation of privacy, unless that information or material con-
stituted a matter of legitimate public concern justifying publication in the 
public interest. This reflected a variation of the first element of the joint 
judgment and its preference for treating legitimate public concern as a de-
fence rather than as pertaining to the cause of action. As such it was closer to 
the formulation in the United States; 
• whether the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy depended 
largely on whether publication of the information or material about the plain-
tiff’s private life would, in the particular circumstances, cause substantial 
offence to a reasonable person. This again addressed the joint judgment’s 
first element, and reflected the definition of ‘private facts’ 
 
136 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1, 36. 
137 Ibid 33–4. 
138 Second Restatement § 652E(a) (1977). 
139 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1, 33. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid 38. 
142 Ibid 35–6. 
143 Ibid 54. 
144 Ibid 62. 
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suggested by Gleeson CJ in Lenah Game Meats.145 As such it differed from 
the joint judgment, which saw the consideration as a second element exclud-
ing trivialities; and 
• whether there was sufficient public concern about the information or material 
to justify publication depended upon whether, in the circumstances, those to 
whom the publication was directed could reasonably be said to have a right 
to be informed about it. This is similar to the joint judgment’s view that a 
matter of legitimate public concern differed from a matter merely of public 
interest.146 
The differences therefore lay in whether the standard of ‘offence to a reason-
able person’ was relevant to the facts themselves or to their publication, and 
whether legitimate public concern was treated as a defence or an aspect of the 
tort. It is likely that questions as to whether and to what extent these variations 
make a real difference will depend on the particular circumstances.147 However, 
the fact that there are differences in the majority judgments in espousing a new 
tort is an added complication that will not be welcomed by lower courts. 
The main dissenting judgment was delivered by Keith J, with Anderson J 
delivering a short concurring judgment. Keith J’s opposition to the recognition of 
the new tort was based on three grounds: free speech (as expressly recognised in 
the Bill of Rights); the existing protection of privacy under statutes such as the 
Privacy Act 1993 (NZ) and the Broadcasting Act 1993 (NZ); and the lack of an 
established need for the proposed cause of action.148 However, freedom of 
speech has never been regarded as an absolute right, and a defence such as 
‘legitimate public concern’ constitutes a means for setting an appropriate 
balance. Further, focused legislation would be no obstacle to the common law 
recognising a tort providing a civil remedy in other circumstances where 
considered appropriate.  
The New Zealand approach offers an alternative paradigm for recognition of a 
common law right to privacy in the form of disclosure of private facts. However, 
while achieving the same end result as the United Kingdom courts, the New 
Zealand courts have developed the law without mutating the equitable action for 
breach of confidence under the influence of the HRA.149 Instead, they have 
adopted the United States law on the point so far as it has been judged to be 
appropriate to New Zealand circumstances.150 Perhaps a difficulty, if any, with 
 
145 (2001) 208 CLR 199, 226. 
146 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1, 62. 
147 Keith J suggested that the tort will be easier to demonstrate under Tipping J’s formulation: ibid 
51. 
148 Ibid 42. 
149 See also David Lindsay, ‘Playing Possum? Privacy, Freedom of Speech and the Media following 
ABC v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd’ (2002) 7 Media and Arts Law Review 161, 180; David Lind-
say, ‘Protection of Privacy under the General Law following ABC v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd: 
Where to Now?’ [2002] Privacy Law and Policy Reporter 101. 
150 As David Lindsay has said, if Australian courts are to extend the law to better protect privacy, it 
would be wise to start with a clean slate rather than to do so with the baggage of an existing 
cause of action designed to protect different interests: Lindsay, ‘Protection of Privacy under the 
General Law’, above n 149, 107. 
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the approach is that it may be viewed as something of a leap, as opposed to the 
common law tradition of incremental development.151 
IV  DEVELOPMENTS IN  AUSTRALIA 
It is worth noting that when the Australian Law Reform Commission 
(‘ALRC’) considered the matter of privacy, it did so in terms of the four United 
States categories — namely, intrusion on solitude or seclusion, appropriation of 
identity, public disclosure of private facts and display in a false light. The ALRC 
suggested that Australia should extend protection to the second and third 
categories, that is, public disclosure of private facts and appropriation of 
identity.152 By contrast, in Lenah Game Meats Gleeson CJ favoured the United 
Kingdom approach, protecting private information based on breach of confi-
dence.153 However, Gummow and Hayne JJ (with whom Gaudron J agreed) 
indicated that the first and third categories of privacy under the United States 
rubric — public disclosure of private facts and unreasonable intrusion on 
solitude or seclusion — came closest to protecting the interest identified by 
Sedley LJ and other judges as worthy of protection:154 ‘the fundamental value of 
personal autonomy’.155 
The only Australian case to date that has recognised a right to privacy also 
relied upon the United States framework, endorsing an action for breach of 
privacy in the form of an unreasonable intrusion on another’s solitude.156 In the 
2003 Queensland District Court case Grosse, the plaintiff, the mayor of a local 
authority, alleged that she had suffered psychological harm in the form of, inter 
alia, post-traumatic stress disorder as the consequence of a prolonged course of 
stalking and harassment by the defendant, her former lover. This conduct 
included persistent loitering at or near the plaintiff’s places of residence, work or 
recreation; instances of spying on her private life, unauthorised entry to her 
house and yard; undesired physical contact; repeated offensive phone calls; use 
by the defendant of offensive and insulting language towards the plaintiff; and 
offensive behaviour towards her friends and relatives.157 The plaintiff’s action 
was based on a variety of causes of action, including invasion of privacy, 
harassment, trespass to land, private nuisance, intentional infliction of harm 
under the rule in Wilkinson v Downton,158 and negligent infliction of psychiatric 
damage. The defendant argued that his conduct was innocent, and done for the 
 
151 Cf Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2001] QB 967, 997 (Sedley LJ): ‘The common law … grows by slow 
and uneven degrees. It develops reactively, both in the immediate sense that it is only ever ex-
pounded in response to events and in the longer-term sense that it may be consciously shaped by 
the perceived needs of legal policy.’ 
152 ALRC, Unfair Publication: Defamation and Privacy, Report No 11 (1979) 130–1. 
153 (2001) 208 CLR 199, 224. 
154 Ibid 256. 
155 Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2001] QB 967, 1001. 
156 Grosse [2003] Aust Torts Reports ¶81-706. 
157 Ibid 64 136. 
158 [1897] 2 QB 57 (‘Wilkinson’). 
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protection of the plaintiff’s reputation and that of a non-profit organisation in 
which they were both interested.159 
Skoien SJDC was of the view that the conduct of the defendant included a 
large number of acts which fell within the definition of ‘unlawful stalking’ in 
s 359B of the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) (‘Criminal Code’) and therefore 
amounted to an offence punishable by imprisonment pursuant to s 359E of the 
Criminal Code.160 His Honour pointed out that in almost all of the offences 
contained in the Criminal Code in which an individual person was identified in 
the indictment as the complainant or victim, an actionable tort was also commit-
ted so that the victim would have a right to bring a civil claim for damages.161 
His Honour stated that the same result should follow in the case of a new offence 
like stalking where the victim suffered personal injury or some other detri-
ment.162 
For guidance, Skoien SJDC referred to the four categories of invasion of 
privacy recognised under United States law.163 In particular, his Honour sought 
guidance from the comments of Gummow and Hayne JJ (with whom Gaudron J 
agreed) in Lenah Game Meats, and what his Honour saw as their implicit support 
for public disclosure of private facts and unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion 
as involving interests worth protecting.164 His Honour then took the ‘bold … 
[but] logical and desirable step’ of recognising an actionable right to privacy in 
the circumstances,165 the essential elements of the cause of action being: 
1 a willed act by the defendant; 
2 which intrudes upon the privacy or seclusion of the plaintiff; 
3 in a manner which would be considered highly offensive to a reasonable 
person of ordinary sensibilities; and 
4 which causes the plaintiff detriment in the form of mental, physiological or 
emotional harm or distress, or which prevents or hinders the plaintiff from 
doing an act which he or she is lawfully entitled to do.166 
Skoien SJDC decided that while a defence of public interest should be avail-
able in an appropriate case, no such concept was involved here. It was also 
unnecessary to decide whether an intention to protect or cause a benefit to the 
plaintiff should be a defence, since no such intention on the part of the defendant 
was found to have been present on the facts.167 
His Honour also found that some, but not all, of the other pleaded causes of 
action had been established.168 Since the stalking that constituted the harassment 
 
159 Grosse [2003] Aust Torts Reports ¶81-706, 64 136. 
160 Ibid 64 183. 
161 Ibid 64 184. 
162 Ibid. 
163 See above Part III(A). 
164 Grosse [2003] Aust Torts Reports ¶81-706, 64 186, citing Lenah Game Meats (2001) 208 CLR 
199, 256. 
165 Grosse [2003] Aust Torts Reports ¶81-706, 64 187. 
166 Ibid. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid 64 187–9. 
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in this case also made out the cause of action in the invasion of privacy, there 
was no need to decide whether a tort of harassment should be recognised.169 
Otherwise, the claim for intentional infliction of harm based on Wilkinson170 was 
held to have been made out, inasmuch as there had been damage in the form of 
injury to mental health capable of causing a recognisable physical condition in 
the form of post-traumatic stress disorder.171 This finding relieved Skoien SJDC 
of a decision regarding the claim of negligent infliction of psychiatric harm.172 
While several instances of the defendant’s behaviour were found to have 
amounted to trespass to land, on other occasions, where there had been no actual 
entry onto the plaintiff’s premises, the conduct of the defendant amounted to 
nuisance.173 Moreover, while battery was technically committed through the 
defendant’s administration of an unwanted kiss, it was a matter of de minimis for 
which any damages awarded would only be nominal.174 By contrast, assault in 
the sense of an apprehension of contact was held not to have been established.175 
Ultimately his Honour awarded compensatory damages for the invasion of 
privacy in the amount of $108 000, together with $50 000 aggravated damages 
and $20 000 exemplary damages, making a total damages award of $178 000.176 
An alternative assessment was made with respect to the other causes of action 
that had been upheld, although in each case the appropriate damages were less 
than those awarded for invasion of privacy (since some, but not all, of the 
defendant’s conduct was relevant), and were regarded as duplicating those 
damages. The defendant lodged an appeal to the Queensland Court of Appeal, 
but the case was settled before it was heard.177 
Skoien SJDC was clearly influenced by the United States tort of unreasonable 
intrusion on seclusion when formulating what he saw as the necessary elements 
of this nascent tort. However, when compared with the Second Restatement 
§ 652B a number of variations are evident, although it is not clear in the absence 
of discussion whether his Honour intended these changes. The United States 
formulation ‘intentionally intrudes … upon the solitude or seclusion of another’ 
was restated in two separate elements: (a) a willed act by the defendant; and (b) 
which intrudes upon the privacy or seclusion of the plaintiff. In changing the 
intention requirement from covering both the act and result to the act alone, the 
Queensland formulation would seem to allow for the possibility of culpable 
intrusions which are accidental, provided the intruding act itself is intended. The 
second Queensland element deviates from ‘solitude or seclusion’ to ‘privacy and 
seclusion’ without stating a reason. ‘Seclusion’, the word common to both 
 
169 Ibid 64 188. 
170 This cause of action was recently reaffirmed in Queensland in Carrier v Bonham [2002] 1 Qd R 
474. 
171 [2003] Aust Torts Reports ¶81-706, 64 188. 
172 Ibid. 
173 Ibid 64 189. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Ibid 64 188–9. 
176 Ibid 61 189–91. 
177 Barry Stewart, Invasion of Privacy: A Recent Decision and Its Risks for Australian Business (26 
February 2004) Ebsworth & Ebsworth Lawyers <http://www.ebsworth.com.au/ebsworth/web 
site/eepublishing.nsf/Content/Publication_Alert_PrivacyUpdate_26Feb04>. 
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formulations, connotes being shut off or kept apart, while ‘solitude’ conveys a 
sense of being alone. ‘Privacy’, as already noted, is a term notoriously difficult 
to define. If the term were used, it would need to be accompanied by some 
indication of its intended meaning. 
The same objective standard for the reaction has been adopted, namely that the 
intrusion ‘would be highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibili-
ties’. In light of the wide range of potential interferences, from the trifling to the 
most grievous, this would seem to be a sensible limitation which safeguards 
against indeterminate liability. The limitation is easily justified if, as is the case 
in the United States, the type of damage being contemplated includes mere 
emotional or mental distress.178 
Perhaps the major difference between the United States formulation and that 
introduced by Skoien SJDC was the addition of a fourth element requiring 
‘detriment in the form of mental psychological or emotional harm or distress or 
which prevents or hinders the plaintiff from doing an act which she is lawfully 
entitled to do’.179 Prima facie, that ought to be a level of damage which is 
relatively easily shown. However, the common law traditionally divides civil 
wrongs in terms of trespasses and actions on the case. A significant aspect of the 
distinction lies in the fact that damage is the gist of the action in the latter type of 
claim (such as negligence), whereas the former type of claim is actionable per se. 
In Australia, the basis of the distinction is whether the injury is regarded as direct 
or indirect: if direct, then the claim is classified as a trespass; by contrast, if any 
harm is indirect — or consequential — it is an action on the case.180 Applying 
this analysis suggests that in Australia unreasonable intrusions, if recognised, 
should rank as a trespass and be actionable without proof of damage. 
Skoien SJDC’s fourth element would therefore be unnecessary. 
By contrast, an invasion of privacy in the form of a public disclosure of private 
facts — as in the United Kingdom and New Zealand — involves an indirect but 
intentional injury: the plaintiff’s dignity or humanity is affronted as a conse-
quence of the defendant’s act. This would indicate that, under current Australian 
thinking, an action for disclosure of private facts should be classified as an 
action on the case, ranking alongside the innominate torts such as the action 
based on Wilkinson. As an action on the case, it would require proof of damage 
of a particular kind in order to be compensable. 
This analysis may be distinguished from that which applies in, for example, 
the United Kingdom. There, the distinction between trespass and actions on the 
case is based on intention, rather than directness.181 Disclosure of private facts, 
whether called ‘misuse of private information’ or some other name, as an  
 
 
 
178 As opposed to, for example, the ‘recognisable psychiatric damage’ required for negligence 
actions in Australia: see, eg, Mount Isa Mines Limited v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383; Civil Li-
ability Act 2002 (NSW) s 31; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 72. 
179 Grosse [2003] Aust Torts Reports ¶81-706, 64 187. 
180 Platt v Nutt (1988) 12 NSWLR 231; Hutchins v Maughan [1947] VLR 131. 
181 Fowler v Lanning [1959] 1 QB 426. 
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intentional injury, would be regarded as a form of trespass and therefore action-
able per se. Indeed, this is reflected in the observation of New Zealand judges 
Gault P and Blanchard J in Hosking: 
We do not see personal injury or economic loss as necessary elements of the 
action. The harm to be protected against is in the nature of humiliation and dis-
tress. … We are not concerned with issues of whether there need be recognised 
psychiatric harm.182 
The requirement that the publicity be ‘truly’ humiliating and distressing is 
reinforced by the requirement that it be ‘highly offensive to a reasonable 
person’.183 
Other courts have shown greater reticence than Skoien SJDC in recognising an 
enforceable right to privacy. In Richards v Victoria, the plaintiff, an unsatisfied 
litigant who was diagnosed as suffering from a delusional disorder, alleged that 
he was the victim of harassment by several police officers in a series of inci-
dents.184 The plaintiff’s personal circumstances had seen him living in his car on 
public lands. While Osborn J accepted that the plaintiff had been regularly 
checked by police, including checks of his licence and on occasion the shining of 
lights into his car, his Honour did not accept several bizarre claims including 
allegations of harassment using a police helicopter and various unprovoked 
assaults.185 After referring to Grosse, his Honour thought that it was unnecessary 
to express a final view as to whether a separate tort of invasion or harassment 
should be recognised.186 This was because the plaintiff had failed in any event to 
show that the alleged invasions of privacy could be regarded as highly offensive 
to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibility, or that any unwanted harassment 
was of such a degree of seriousness that no reasonable person should reasonably 
be expected to endure it.187 
By contrast, the decision in Giller was dismissive of a cause of action for 
breach of privacy. Like Grosse, the case involved the aftermath of the breakdown 
of a de facto relationship. The female plaintiff made a number of claims, the 
most relevant for present purposes related to the distress and humiliation she felt 
as the result of the defendant showing and threatening to distribute a video of the 
parties engaging in sexual activities.188 The plaintiff relied on three separate 
causes of action: breach of confidence, intentional infliction of mental harm and 
breach of privacy.189 Gillard J dismissed all three claims. While accepting that 
persons engaging in sexual activity in the privacy of their home involved a 
relationship of mutual trust and confidence, and that the showing of video 
footage of this conduct without the consent of the parties would be an unauthor-
 
182 [2005] 1 NZLR 1, 35. 
183 Ibid. 
184 [2003] VSC 368 (Unreported, Osborn J, 2 October 2003) [7]. 
185 Ibid [86]. 
186 Ibid [93]. 
187 Ibid. 
188 [2004] VSC 113 (Unreported, Gillard J, 7 April 2004) [1]. 
189 Ibid [148]–[171] (breach of confidence); [172]–[186] (intentional infliction of mental harm); 
[187]–[189] (privacy). 
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ised distribution of confidential information, his Honour emphasised that the 
cause of action for breach of confidence was an equitable one.190 General 
damages for physical or mental injury, distress or upset are common law 
remedies, but were not recoverable in equity.191 In so finding, his Honour 
confronted the ‘vexed question’ that the English Court of Appeal suggested that 
judges should not take time to address. His Honour reached a justifiable conclu-
sion which recognised the consequences of not regarding the equitable action as 
having somehow been converted into a tort.192 The plaintiff also failed in her 
claim for intentional infliction of mental harm, pursuant to Wilkinson. This was 
because it was essential for the plaintiff to prove some form of physical or 
mental injury. The law did not allow for recovery for pure mental distress 
alone.193 
Unfortunately, his Honour gave the claim for breach of privacy short shrift: it 
was noted that Kaye had held that there was no cause of action based on personal 
privacy, but that nonetheless Lenah Game Meats had effectively opened the door 
to such a development.194 His Honour simply concluded, however, that in his 
opinion the ‘law had not developed to the point where the law in Australia 
recognises an action for breach of privacy.’195 Gillard J cited three authorities in 
support. The first was the 1998 edition of a textbook, which merely examined 
the topic of privacy in a general fashion.196 The other two were dicta by Mur-
phy J and Kirby P.197 However, the first of these dicta was in the judgment of 
Murphy J in the 1982 High Court case Church of Scientology Inc v Woodward, 
where his Honour referred to ‘unjustified invasion of privacy’ as one of the 
‘developing torts’.198 The other was Kirby P’s dicta in Australian Consolidated 
Press Ltd v Ettingshausen that, due to legislative inaction, no tort in relation to 
invasion of privacy existed and that it would therefore be inappropriate to award 
 
190 Ibid [160]. 
191 Ibid. Gillard J held that the Lord Cairns’ Act equitable damages were not available because these 
were only available in addition to, or in substitution for, an injunction or specific performance. 
Here the plaintiff had only claimed damages for the breach of confidence, not an injunction: at 
[165]. 
192 This may raise the wider issue of the accepted degree of fusion between law and equity. It would 
seem that the orthodox Australian view is dualist; that is, while administration of the common 
law and equity may have become fused, they are based upon different systems of justice. In the 
words of Walter Ashburner, ‘the two streams of jurisdiction, though they run in the same chan-
nel, run side by side and do not mingle their waters’: Denis Browne, Ashburner’s Principles of 
Equity (2nd ed, 1933) 18. See also Felton v Mulligan (1971) 124 CLR 367, 392 (Windeyer J);  
R P Meagher, J D Heydon and M J Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity: Doc-
trines and Remedies (4th ed, 2002) xi; P D Finn, Fiduciary Obligations (1977). Some English 
commentators have less difficulty in recognising a law of obligations that integrates equity and 
the common law: see, eg, Peter Birks (ed), English Private Law (2000); Central London Prop-
erty Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd [1947] KB 130, 134–5 (Denning J); United Scientific 
Holdings Ltd v Burnley Borough Council [1978] AC 904, 924–5 (Lord Diplock). 
193 Giller [2004] VSC 113 (Unreported, Gillard J, 7 April 2004) [177]. His Honour saw concerns of 
a flood of litigation if, for example, a shop assistant, or a club bouncer or barman, who was 
publicly offensive to a customer, was to be held liable for any humiliation or distress caused: see 
also Wainwright v Home Office [2004] 2 AC 406, 428 (Lord Scott). 
194 Giller [2004] VSC 113 (Unreported, Gillard J, 7 April 2004) [188]. 
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196 John Fleming, The Law of Torts (9th ed, 1998). 
197 Giller [2004] VSC 113 (Unreported, Gillard J, 7 April 2004) [188]. 
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the plaintiff in that case damages for invasion of his privacy.199 In other words, in 
support of his summary dismissal of the claim for breach of privacy, Gillard J 
cited three authorities that all predated Lenah Game Meats and its rejection of 
Victoria Park as a barrier to the recognition of a common law right to privacy. 
Indeed the statement by Murphy J would seem to offer some encouragement for 
recognition of the tort, rather than being against it. The authorities cited therefore 
do not constitute a particularly compelling case against the recognition of a tort 
of invasion of privacy, or at least do not justify a summary dismissal of the 
claim. Gillard J made no reference to Grosse, although it must be acknowledged 
that the intrusion tort it recognised would have been of limited assistance in the 
disclosure-type scenario in issue. 
In the absence of a detailed examination of any proposed tort of invasion of 
privacy, two major points emerge from Giller. The first is the inadequacy of the 
action for breach of confidence in providing effective redress for disclosure of 
private facts where the plaintiff wishes to recover compensation for alleged 
injury. The action only has utility in this regard if it is developed beyond its 
traditional equitable form and assumes an existence in tort. This squarely 
addresses an issue that United Kingdom courts have been reluctant to confront 
directly. The second is the question of whether the tort of intentional infliction of 
mental harm under the rule in Wilkinson is a sufficient response to invasions of 
privacy, and whether it relieves the need to consider development of a separate 
tort even if one concludes that there is a need for some form of protection of 
personal privacy. This will be considered in detail in the following section. 
V  PROTECTION OF  PRIVACY IN  AUSTRALIA? 
A  Impetus for Change 
Should privacy in Australia receive more than the piecemeal protection cur-
rently available? That there have been developments in other common law 
countries may be a reason for change in itself. Naturally, however, the impetus 
for any change in Australia cannot be the same as in the United Kingdom, which 
operates under the influence of the HRA and the ECHR. Further, as Callinan J 
pointed out, Australia should not merely adopt United States jurisprudence, since 
the political and constitutional history of Australia is unlike that of the United 
States, where the relevant jurisprudence is complicated by the First Amend-
ment.200 Instead, his Honour suggested that ‘[a]ny principles for an Australian 
tort of privacy would need to be worked out on a case by case basis in a dis-
tinctly Australian context.’201 
Australia does share significant historical, political and cultural similarities 
with New Zealand. As such, the influences that persuaded the New Zealand 
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Court of Appeal might be found equally persuasive by Australian courts. Three 
factors can be highlighted. 
The first consideration is the need for the law to accommodate developments 
in technology and changes in attitudes, practices and values in society.202 The 
21st century is a time of telephoto lenses, long-range parabolic microphones, and 
mobile phone cameras, as well as other technological advances such as the 
internet that provide easy means of dissemination of information to a worldwide 
audience. These advances mean that there is now nowhere on the planet that a 
person may retreat with an absolute assurance of being left alone. Also, access to 
means of widespread publicity is now at the fingertips of many rather than a few. 
Further, while it has perhaps taken longer to become established than that of the 
United Kingdom, there is now a developing tabloid media in Australia where the 
profits are the dominant goal and the chequebook is a ready tool in trade when 
trying to ‘out-scoop’ the opposition in competition for stories. This is productive 
of a zealous style of journalism for which sensation, scandal and emotion are 
common touchstones. These are all developments of the last 10 or so years. 
The second factor is the emergence of international concern for the protection 
of human rights. The relevant right protected by privacy has been variously 
described as the ‘well-being and development of an individual’,203 ‘human 
autonomy and dignity’,204 or ‘human dignity’.205 There is no reason why an 
Australian would place any lesser weight on such a right. 
The third factor is that privacy is a right or interest recognised to varying 
degrees of particularity in international covenants and conventions, including 
those to which Australia is a party. As Gault P and Blanchard J pointed out in 
Hosking, there is an international trend to develop the common law consistently 
with such treaties and conventions: 
To ignore international obligations would be to exclude a vital source of rele-
vant guidance. It is unreal to draw upon the decisions of Courts in other juris-
dictions (as we commonly do) yet not draw upon the teachings of international 
law. There is the additional factor in the field of human rights declared by the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights … that individuals can 
seek remedies against the state at international law after exhausting domestic 
remedies. This cannot be disregarded in considering whether, in a particular 
case in the domestic Courts, a remedy should be available.206 
A further matter that may potentially provide additional impetus in Australia is 
a likely outcome of recent discussions of the Standing Committee of Attor-
neys-General directed towards achieving uniformity in defamation laws. A major 
obstacle that has prevented such an outcome in the past has been the justification 
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203 Campbell [2004] 2 AC 457, 464 (Lord Nicholls). 
204 Ibid 472 (Lord Hoffmann). 
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defence, with four jurisdictions (Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia and 
the Northern Territory) applying the common law standard of truth alone, and 
four jurisdictions (Queensland, Tasmania, the Australian Capital Territory and 
New South Wales) applying a truth and public benefit/public interest standard. 
The latter meaning may be traced back to recommendations of a House of Lords 
Select Committee in 1847, which was first adopted in New South Wales in the 
Defamation Act 1847 (NSW). This was seemingly in order to facilitate the social 
reintegration of ex-convicts,207 but has since provided a ‘second best’ measure of 
protection from invasion of privacy in the form of disclosure of private matters 
under the guise of revealing the truth. The public benefit/public interest standard 
requires a publication to promote the public good rather than merely pandering 
to those avid for scandal or invading the legitimate privacy of an individual.208 
The most recent attempt to reach uniformity has included an agreement for all 
jurisdictions to apply the common law defence of truth alone, meaning a loss of 
protection for privacy in those jurisdictions previously applying the public 
benefit/public interest standard.209 
B  Intentional Infliction of Mental Harm: A Viable Alternative? 
In Grosse, a claim based on the rule in Wilkinson was successful, while a 
similar claim was dismissed in Giller due to a lack of evidence of the necessary 
damage.210 Could such a claim be a sufficient means of dealing with invasions of 
privacy without the need to recognise a new tort? 
In the first place, the tort of intentional infliction of mental harm will not be a 
complete answer. It may have been suitable in the kind of circumstances 
contemplated in Grosse and Giller, namely an individual being subjected to the 
deliberately vindictive acts of another. Where, by contrast, the invasion of 
privacy is by the media, a plaintiff is likely to be confronted with the argument 
that the defendant’s intention was to cover the story, rather than inflict harm on 
the plaintiff. The tort of intentional infliction of mental harm would therefore be 
confined to certain kinds of cases, just as trespass and nuisance or other causes 
of action that make up the current patchwork of protection may be effective in 
particular cases to which they are suited. 
The intentional infliction of mental harm tort may involve a more fundamental 
difficulty. Recently, in Wainwright v Home Office, Lord Hoffmann (with whom 
the other Law Lords agreed) considered an argument that an action for invasion 
of privacy could be based on Wilkinson.211 However, as Lord Hoffmann pointed 
out, Wilkinson was decided at a time when the Privy Council in Victorian 
Railways Commissioners v Coultas212 was authority for the view that nervous 
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209 See Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, Model Defamation Provisions (2004) s 29; cf the 
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tion of a tort protecting privacy: ALRC, Unfair Publication, above n 152, 118. 
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shock was too remote a consequence of a negligent act to be a recoverable head 
of damage. It was evident that the decision in Wilkinson, by being based on 
intention, was an attempt to evade Coultas, although its reliance on intention was 
dubious since Mr Downton in fact only intended to cause Mrs Wilkinson to 
suffer a fright, not any resulting illness. An unanswered question, therefore, was 
whether the intention had to be actual or imputed. When the rule in Wilkinson 
was next considered,213 Coultas was no longer good authority and Wilkinson was 
comfortably accommodated by the law concerning nervous shock caused by 
negligence, dispensing with the need to address whether the requisite intention 
needed to be actual or merely imputed. Lord Hoffmann concluded that, since in 
cases of psychiatric injury there is no point in seeking to rely on intention when 
negligence will do just as well, Wilkinson was left with ‘no leading role in the 
modern law.’214 While it was true that a tort of intentional infliction of mental 
harm would not involve the policy considerations which gave rise to the limits 
on claims for negligence, the defendant must actually have acted in a way which 
he or she knew to be unjustifiable and intended to cause harm, or at least acted 
without caring whether he or she caused harm or not. The kind of imputed 
intention verging on negligence contemplated by Wilkinson would not do.215 
What, then, is the position in Australia? In Wilkinson, Wright J held that the 
defendant was liable for having ‘wilfully done an act calculated to cause physical 
harm to the plaintiff’,216 since the defendant’s act was ‘so plainly calculated to 
produce some effect of the kind which was produced that an intention to produce 
it ought to be imputed to the defendant’.217 It did not matter that more harm was 
done than was expected or anticipated, since ‘that is commonly the case with all 
wrongs.’218 In Australia, the first case of intentional harm was Bun-
yan v Jordan.219 Latham CJ stated that if a person ‘deliberately does an act of a 
kind calculated to cause physical injury … and in fact causes physical injury to 
that other person, he is liable in damages.’220 ‘Calculated’ was regarded as 
meaning objectively likely to happen. Latham CJ stated that the requirement was 
that ‘it was naturally to be expected that they might cause a very severe nervous 
shock.’221 More recently, in Northern Territory v Mengel, it was said that 
Wilkinson proscribed ‘acts which are calculated in the ordinary course to cause 
harm … or which are done with reckless indifference to the harm that is likely to 
ensue’.222 
In Carrier v Bonham, McPherson JA (with whom McMurdo P and Moynihan J 
agreed) noted the oddity in Wilkinson that it was an intentional act which had 
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reasonably foreseeable consequences, which were apparently not in fact foreseen 
by the defendant in all their severity.223 However, his Honour pointed out that the 
same could be said for most everyday acts that are called actionable negligence 
and which are in fact wholly or partly a product of intentional conduct.224 For 
example, driving a motor vehicle at high speed through a residential area is an 
intentional act even if injuring people or property on the way is not a result 
actually intended.225 In his Honour’s view, Wilkinson was merely an example of 
that kind.226 Indeed, his Honour reasoned that it was no longer relevant whether 
the act was done intentionally or negligently, or partly one and partly the other, 
since what matters is whether the consequences of the conduct, whether foreseen 
or not, were reasonably foreseeable and as such should have been averted or 
avoided.227 In fact, there was but a single tort of failing to use reasonable care to 
avoid damage however caused.228 
It may be, therefore, that Australian courts should also take the view that the 
rule enunciated in Wilkinson was a creature of its time and is of limited utility 
today. This would mean that there would be no simple alternative available in 
Anglo-Australian law based on an intentional infliction of mental distress. If 
there is in truth a single tort related to mental harm, then presumably it is subject 
to the well-accepted limits of requiring a recognisable psychiatric illness, and the 
plaintiff’s reaction should be judged against the standard of a person of normal 
resilience.229 
This may raise the question that if the principle in Wilkinson itself is a poor 
vehicle, could privacy nevertheless be protected by recognising an action for an 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, similar to that operating in the United 
States? This tort requires that the defendant must have engaged in ‘extreme and 
outrageous behaviour.’230 Once again there would be difficulties reconciling the 
tort with the refusal of Anglo-Australian courts to compensate ordinary distress 
and other emotions. Even though this tort is supported by an extensive body of 
jurisprudence in the United States, its introduction in Australia might be consid-
ered overkill if the main objective is merely to find a way of recognising a right 
to privacy. 
C  Potential Form of the Tort 
If, as is argued, there is sufficient impetus for Australia to recognise a right to 
privacy, the next issue is how that right should be protected. Any protection of 
privacy should correspond to the factors that influence its adoption. It may be 
 
223 [2002] 1 Qd R 474, 484. 
224 Ibid. 
225 Ibid. 
226 Ibid. 
227 Ibid. 
228 Ibid. 
229 See Giller [2004] VSC 113 (Unreported, Gillard J, 7 April 2004) [172]–[186]. 
230 Second Restatement § 46 (1977). 
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accepted, for example, that the impetus identified above does not go so far as to 
promote a general right to privacy.231 
Moreover, the above factors do not support protection from breach of privacy 
in the form of what the United States calls ‘appropriation’. Even in the United 
States, appropriation of another’s name or likeness has been criticised as being 
more to do with a right of publicity than with a right to privacy.232 As Gummow 
and Hayne JJ stated in Lenah Game Meats, the plaintiff’s complaint in such a 
case is more likely to be that the defendant has acted for a commercial gain, 
thereby depriving the plaintiff of the opportunity of commercial exploitation of 
that name or likeness for his or her own benefit.233 This has nothing to do with, 
for example, a right to human dignity. 
Indeed, Raymond Wacks has opined that not only appropriation but also the 
‘false light’ category in the United States is ‘a questionable application of 
“privacy” to circumstances that have only the most tenuous relationship to the 
concept.’234 Perhaps a stronger basis for rejecting ‘false light’ claims in Australia 
is to draw a parallel to the position of the High Court when considering whether 
to expand the tort of negligence. In the United States, being portrayed in a ‘false 
light’ often arises in relation to reporters embellishing facts to produce ‘a better 
story’235 or inappropriate captions being affixed to photographs. It need not, but 
often does, result in damage to reputation, meaning that there is a high degree of 
overlap with defamation. The two torts are often pleaded in the alternative.236 
However, it is likely that in Australia, due to the definition of defamatory matter 
embracing publications which lower the plaintiff in the estimation of others, 
induce others to shun or avoid the plaintiff, or expose the plaintiff to be despised 
or ridiculed, there will be an even greater overlap with defamation. The High 
Court has previously indicated that, in order to preserve coherence in the law, it 
is unwilling to expand the law where it would lead to one tort encroaching upon 
the established domain of another.237 This is especially the case with defamation 
laws, which ‘strike a balance of rights and obligations, duties and freedoms.’238  
In relation to the remaining two manifestations, there is good reason to support 
recognition of an action for invasion of privacy both in the form of unreasonable 
intrusion and disclosure of private facts. 
In addition to having the support of the ALRC, there was at least implicit 
support from the High Court in Lenah Game Meats for protection from disclo-
 
231 Wainwright v Home Office [2004] 2 AC 406 (humiliation following strip search at prison). This 
accords with the recommendation of the ALRC: see ALRC, Privacy, Report No 22 (1983) vol 2, 
26. 
232 See, eg, Melville B Nimmer, ‘The Right of Publicity’ (1954) 19 Law and Contemporary 
Problems 203. 
233 (2001) 208 CLR 199, 256. 
234 Raymond Wacks, Personal Information: Privacy and the Law (1989) 35–6. 
235 Cantrell v Forest City Publishing Co, 419 US 245 (1974) (a report following up the effect on the 
family of a man who died in a bridge disaster emphasised the family’s poverty and contained 
many inaccuracies, including statements concerning the wife’s mood and attitude when the 
reporter had not even talked to her. This was held to be an invasion of privacy). 
236 See Prosser and Keeton, above n 45, 865. 
237 Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562; Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317. 
238 Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562, 576 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Hayne and 
Callinan JJ). 
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sure of private facts, although Gummow and Hayne JJ manifested such support 
by referring to the relevant section of the Second Restatement,239 while 
Gleeson CJ endorsed a United Kingdom-style development of breach of confi-
dence.240 This protection might be seen as a useful adjunct to the protection of 
private information from wrongful use or disclosure by those who have collected 
or are in possession of it under the Information Privacy Principles241 and 
National Privacy Principles242 enacted at the federal and state level in Australia, 
as well as in New Zealand and the United Kingdom.243 It will also replace the 
protection enjoyed for many years in Queensland, Tasmania, the Australian 
Capital Territory and New South Wales by virtue of the public benefit/public 
interest requirement for the justification defence to defamation, if and when it is 
lost through the reform of defamation laws by the Standing Committee of 
Attorneys-General. 
An obvious shortcoming of the recognition of the disclosure of private facts 
tort alone is that it is unable to provide a remedy for all media invasions, such as 
where there is a physical intrusion but usable information is not obtained, 
disclosed or otherwise used.244 Yet invasion of privacy in the form of unreason-
able intrusion has been referred to as the ‘archetypal’ form of breach of pri-
vacy.245 Cases such as this prompted the English Court of Appeal’s complaint 
regarding the inadequacy of existing laws in Kaye — a criticism still unad-
dressed notwithstanding the developments culminating in Campbell — and 
formed the basis of recognition of a right to privacy in Grosse.246 There is 
sufficient impetus for the tort’s recognition, with modern media representatives 
not infrequently crossing the line of propriety in their competitive zeal. 
Like the Second Restatement § 652B, an Australian unreasonable intrusion tort 
should encompass intrusions ‘physical or otherwise’ in order to embrace the 
technological advances in surveillance that are now available. Whether the 
‘solitude or seclusion’ formulation in the United States should be adopted is 
more problematic. As has been seen, Skoien SJDC in Grosse substituted this 
with the phrase ‘privacy or seclusion’.247 Further, recent cases in the United 
States have recognised that the unreasonable intrusion tort may apply even where 
the plaintiff was in a public or semi-public place, such as a restaurant or in the 
workplace.248 Such recognition may make words such as ‘seclusion’ and 
‘solitude’ problematic insofar as they suggest locations generally not open to 
 
239 Lenah Game Meats (2001) 208 CLR 199, 253–6. 
240 Ibid 224–5. 
241 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 14; and in some states: see, eg, Privacy and Personal Information 
Protection Act 1998 (NSW) pt 2 div 1; Information Privacy Act 2000 (Vic) s 14. 
242 Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act 2000 (Cth) s 6. 
243 Privacy Act 1993 (NZ) s 6; Data Protection Act 1998 (UK) c 29, s 4. 
244 Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson, ‘Confidence and Privacy: A Re-Examination’ (1996) 55 
Cambridge Law Journal 447, 454. 
245 Fleming, above n 196, 666. 
246 [2003] Aust Torts Reports ¶81-706, 64 187 (Skoien SJDC). 
247 Ibid. 
248 Stessman v American Black Hawk Broadcasting Co, 416 NW 2d 685, 687–8 (Lavorato J) (Iowa, 
1987) (restaurant); Sanders v American Broadcasting Companies Inc, 978 P 2d 67, 69 (Werde-
gar J) (Cal, 1999), review denied 2000 Cal LEXIS 1892 (Cal, 2000) (workplace). 
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public view. The real focus in such cases may ultimately be best designated by 
the term ‘privacy’ or, more accurately, a state or situation in which the plaintiff 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Adoption of such a meaning has a number of advantages. It recognises that the 
concept is a matter of fact and degree rather than a matter of absolutes. There 
will no doubt be a reasonable expectation of privacy where someone is in his or 
her own home, or where a swimmer sunbathes on a private as opposed to a 
public beach. By the same token, there would be little if any expectation of 
privacy in a public shopping centre.249 However, the ‘reasonable expectation’ 
test also accommodates some cases where the plaintiff is in certain public places. 
While the physical setting may be a significant factor when deciding whether 
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, it should not be conclusive. Much 
will depend on the circumstances of the particular case. A niche in a public 
hallway in circumstances where the parties have gone to lengths to ensure they 
are not overheard might be regarded as private. Similarly, a parishioner engaged 
in prayer in a public church should be free from intrusion. The situation may 
become complicated where, for example, the church visit is in order to mourn a 
person of public interest. In this case, the expectation as to privacy may alternate 
between being high and low. 
Reasonable expectations of privacy may also accommodate cases involving 
public figures. Public figures have been defined as, for example, ‘persons 
holding public office and/or using public resources and, more broadly speaking, 
all those who play a role in public life, whether in politics, the economy, the arts, 
the social sphere, sport, or in any other domain.’250 The common factor in such a 
definition is the element of choice. There is, in addition, a category of persons 
who are unwittingly thrust into the spotlight, perhaps by virtue of their associa-
tion with an event that attracts the attention of the media. 
It would be possible to develop a special test for public figures. For example, it 
might be asked whether, at the particular time, the individual was ‘contribut[ing] 
to [a] debate of general interest to society’,251 such as performing official 
functions rather than engaging in activities relating only to his or her private life. 
Under such a test, a public figure photographed shopping might be deemed as 
not contributing to a debate of general interest, and therefore entitled to his or 
her privacy, when, in fact, by venturing into such a public situation it could be 
said that he or she could not reasonably expect to have his or her privacy 
respected.252 
 
249 Cf Peck v United Kingdom (2003) I Eur Court HR 123.  
250 Von Hannover v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1, 30 (Cabral Barreto P). 
251 Ibid 27 (Cabral Barreto P, Ress, Caflisch, Türmen, Zupancic, Hedigan and Traja JJ). 
252 Thus the Court in von Hannover v Germany thought that Princess Caroline of Monaco, when not 
performing official duties, was not contributing to a debate of public interest. Further, the public 
had no legitimate interest in knowing where she was or how she behaved in her private life, even 
if she appeared in places that could not be described as secluded: ibid 28. By contrast, the sepa-
rate concurring judgment of Cabral Barreto P held that ‘it has to be acknowledged that, in view 
of their fame, a public figure’s life outside their home, and particularly in public places, is inevi-
tably subject to certain constraints’: at 31. In his Honour’s view, the Princess had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in some, but not all, cases in which she ventured into public places. 
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However, the risk with special rules is that the focus can easily shift from the 
rule itself to whether or not a particular individual meets the definition of ‘public 
figure’, when there may be varying views about the precise meaning of the term. 
For example, in the definition cited above, what exactly does ‘any other domain’ 
mean? Does it include, say, an academic who offers comment in particular 
instances, or who seeks publicity for his or her research findings but who might, 
for the greater part of his or her time, live and work in relative obscurity? 
A more flexible approach, as favoured by Gault P and Blanchard J in Hosking, 
is to apply a test of whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
circumstances.253 What a reasonable expectation entails may differ with the 
attitude of the plaintiff and the facts of the case.254 Nevertheless, one test is able 
to apply in all cases without the possible distraction of a misleading threshold 
test. Thus, a popular singer might prima facie be expected to have less of an 
expectation of privacy on the basis of his or her general courting of publicity. 
However, in the balancing exercise, this factor may be outweighed by other 
circumstances, such as his or her attendance at the bedside of a seriously injured 
or dying family member, which may suggest a greater expectation of being left 
alone. A person who becomes prominent through his or her involvement in an 
accident might reasonably expect a temporary loss of privacy, perhaps to the 
same degree as one who courts publicity, but might also expect that loss of 
privacy to subside relatively quickly. 
The relevant intrusions should be defined as instances of an interference with 
the plaintiff in a physical sense, such as invading his or her personal space or 
surreptitiously photographing him or her, and gaining unauthorised access to the 
plaintiff’s personal affairs, including hacking into his or her computer or reading 
his or her diary. In relation to the meaning of ‘personal affairs’, reference might 
be made to the ALRC’s definition of ‘private facts’ in terms of matters related to 
the health, private behaviour, home life, or personal or family relationships of an 
individual.255 The ‘gaining unauthorised access to personal affairs’ will be a 
point of potential interface between the two torts. In the first instance, there may 
be an intrusion in the course of the gathering of information, followed by a 
public disclosure of those private facts. The first invasion may have been by the 
media, but need not have been. The second invasion will usually involve a media 
organisation, but may involve another defendant, such as where the person who 
carried out the intrusion then reveals what he or she has learnt during a television 
interview.256 The remedies available where there has been, for example, an 
intrusion which produced publishable material or a contemplated publication of 
private facts, should enable a pending publication to be pre-empted.257 As  
 
 
 
253 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1, 41. 
254 Ibid 33. 
255 See also ALRC, Unfair Publication, above n 152, 124. 
256 Framed this way, if the factory in Lenah Game Meats had been, say, a sole trader operation, then 
there may have been an action for intrusion against the animal activists and an action for disclo-
sure against the television broadcaster. 
257 See also Morgan, above n 115, 445. 
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already seen in the United States, the second tort is more likely to be criticised 
on free speech grounds, as not even the First Amendment can be used as a means 
to justify excessive intrusions. 
It has been noted in the discussion of the elements articulated in Grosse that 
the wide array of potential intrusions, and the differing degrees of sensitivity in 
the community, necessitate an objective standard, such as the intrusion being 
‘highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities’. While this 
may ultimately be an intuitive decision, it is nevertheless a sensible measure that 
should avoid open-ended liability for all actual or perceived slights. This is 
especially so in the case of a claim which is actionable per se, and which could 
therefore compensate cases of mere distress or upset. It has already been 
suggested that the unreasonable intrusion tort should be such a claim. 
In support of the recognition of an unreasonable intrusion tort, reference may 
be made to the so-called tort of harassment, which is generally regarded as being 
in its embryonic form. The similarity between the two torts was alluded to by 
Gummow and Hayne JJ in Lenah Game Meats.258 One of the earliest cases 
involving harassment was Khorasandjian v Bush,259 concerning the daughter of 
a tenant who was the subject of a series of harassing telephone calls.260 This 
action was actually framed as a private nuisance, which ultimately led to it being 
overruled in a later case on the grounds that the plaintiff lacked the necessary 
standing to sue.261 Part of the difficulty lies in settling on a precise definition of 
harassment.262 It may be that harassment is limited to ‘acts calculated to cause 
harm to the plaintiff’,263 in which case it might be seen as embracing, but not 
being limited to, unreasonable intrusion. As noted in Grosse, Skoien SJDC was 
content to hold that since the stalking, which constituted the harassment in that 
case, also satisfied the cause of action in the invasion of privacy, there was no 
need to decide whether a tort of harassment should be recognised. Like Grosse 
and its references to the Criminal Code provisions concerning stalking, similar 
cases such as Khorasandjian seem to be directed at providing civil remedies for 
the criminal offence of harassment.264 However, not all cases of unreasonable 
intrusion will involve harassment, since the intrusion may be constituted by a 
single act, or the defendant may have no intention of harming the plaintiff. 
Zealous media pursuit of the plaintiff in coverage of a story may be an example 
of both points. Harassment, insofar as it has developed, may therefore not itself 
be the correct fit for unreasonable intrusions. However, a tort of unreasonable 
 
258 (2001) 208 CLR 199, 255. 
259 [1993] QB 727 (‘Khorasandjian’). 
260 In the United States, similar facts are used to illustrate Second Restatement § 652B (1977), based 
on Housh v Peth, 165 Ohio St 35 (1956). 
261 Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] AC 655. 
262 Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307, 342–3 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron 
and McHugh JJ). 
263 Chapman v Conservation Council of South Australia (2002) 82 SASR 449, 492 (Williams J) 
(citations omitted). 
264 The tort was applied in Thomas v National Union of Mineworkers [1986] Ch 20, but rejected in 
Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust [2003] 3 All ER 932. Harassment in England is now both a 
criminal offence and statutory tort: Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (UK) c 40. See Mor-
gan, above n 115, 462–5. 
   
M.U.L.R. — Author — printed 19/09/2005 at 6:14 PM — page 373 of 51
  
2005] A Tort of Invasion of Privacy in Australia? 373 
     
intrusion could comfortably accommodate cases of harassment. Thus it is 
submitted that development of a means of civil recourse for harassment should 
not be regarded as an end in itself, but should instead be regarded as subsumed 
within the development of a wider tort of unreasonable intrusion.  
Accordingly, it is suggested that Australia should adopt a tort of unreasonable 
intrusion upon privacy, the elements being: 
1 an intentional intrusion (whether physical or otherwise) upon the situation of 
another (whether as to the person or his or her personal affairs) where there is 
a reasonable expectation of privacy; and 
2 the intrusion would be ‘highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary 
sensibilities’. 
In relation to disclosure of private facts, the crucial question will again be 
whether there is a reasonable expectation that the particular information be 
regarded as private. This is clear from the experience in both New Zealand 
(which adapted the United States approach) and the United Kingdom, which 
have reached approximately the same result by two entirely different routes. The 
‘reasonable expectation’ test is capable of dealing with an issue of information 
which has reached the public domain. Here, the disclosure tort differs from the 
action for breach of confidence. Under the latter, once the information reaches 
the public domain it is no longer capable of protection. However, a reasonable 
expectation of privacy test is capable of greater flexibility. It is able to provide a 
principled basis for justifying why information, which has only had a limited 
release, should still be capable of protection.265 The plaintiff’s reasonable 
expectations may also provide a basis on which information that has been on the 
public record for a long time, such as an old criminal conviction, may neverthe-
less be regarded as private and not for publication.266 
It is also evident that there should be a standard of what would be ‘highly 
offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities.’ Less obvious, how-
ever, is what this standard should be used to measure. In the Second Restatement 
§ 652D, the reference is to the ‘matter concerning the private life’ of another 
which is to be ‘highly offensive to a reasonable person’. It was also in this sense 
that the phrase was suggested by Gleeson CJ in Lenah Game Meats as being a 
practical test for what is private.267 However, it was widely rejected as a general 
test by the House of Lords in Campbell.268 Lord Nicholls stated his objection on 
two grounds: 
First, the ‘highly offensive’ phrase is suggestive of a stricter test of private in-
formation than a reasonable expectation of privacy. Second, the ‘highly offen-
sive’ formulation can all too easily bring into account, when deciding whether 
the disclosed information was private, considerations which go more properly 
to issues of proportionality; for instance, the degree of intrusion into private 
 
265 Cf A-G (UK) v Guardian Newspapers Ltd [No 2] [1990] 1 AC 109, 260 (Lord Keith). 
266 Cf Tucker [1986] 2 NZLR 716, 733 (McGrechan J). 
267 (2001) 208 CLR 199, 226. 
268 [2004] 2 AC 457, 466 (Lord Nicholls), 482 (Lord Hope), 495 (Baroness Hale), 504 (Lord 
Carswell). 
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life, and the extent to which publication was a matter of proper public concern. 
This could be a recipe for confusion.269 
Baroness Hale simply stated that ‘[a]n objective reasonable expectation test is 
much simpler and clearer than the test’ attributed to Gleeson CJ.270 Instead, the 
phrase ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ was preferred as the main test for 
privacy, with the ‘highly offensive to a reasonable person’ standard being 
relegated to reflecting proportionality when the balance between the expectation 
of privacy and freedom of speech is difficult to determine.271 
However, there were differing views on this point within the majority of the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal in Hosking. While Tipping J saw the standard as 
indicating when there would be a reasonable expectation of privacy,272 a 
different approach was taken by Gault P and Blanchard J in their joint judgment. 
Their Honours endorsed a two-stage test: first, facts in relation to which there is 
a reasonable expectation of privacy; and second, ‘publicity given to those private 
facts that would be considered highly offensive to an objective reasonable 
person.’273 In other words, instead of being a measure of the privacy of the facts, 
the standard was seen as relevant to the publication aspect. 
There may be good reason for following the judgment of Gault P and 
Blanchard J. When used in relation to the facts, there is a risk of the standard 
being a fifth wheel. However, associating the test with the publication provides a 
means for rejection of trivial or objectionable claims. Accordingly, no action for 
invasion of privacy would lie against a nurse who makes the medical condition 
of a famous patient the subject of gossip among friends and co-workers, whereas 
there may be grounds for complaint if the nurse instead gave the patient’s details 
to the media. It would also ensure that the two privacy torts would be consistent, 
avoiding complications — particularly in the case of intrusion upon the 
plaintiff’s personal affairs — if the test referred to the defendant’s act in the case 
of intrusion, but was then a measure of the quality of the information in the case 
of disclosure. 
It was seen in the discussion of Grosse above, by applying the current 
Australian distinction between trespass and actions on the case, that the 
disclosure of private facts tort should properly be classified as an action on the 
case, for which damage is the gist of the action.274 However, as an intentional 
tort, there is no need for the considerations associated with negligence, which 
require limitation of claims to recognisable psychiatric illnesses. Accordingly, it 
is submitted that proof of emotional distress, embarrassment or humiliation 
should be sufficient to ground the tort.275 
 
269 Ibid 466. 
270 Ibid 495. 
271 Ibid 466 (Lord Nicholls), 482 (Lord Hope), 496 (Baroness Hale). 
272 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1, 64–5. 
273 Ibid 32. 
274 See above nn 180–1 and accompanying text.  
275 See also ALRC, Unfair Publication, above n 152, 124. 
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It is submitted, therefore, that a second tort protecting privacy should be 
recognised in the form of a disclosure of private facts tort, the elements of which 
would be: 
1 the existence of facts in relation to which there is a reasonable expectation of 
privacy; 
2 publicity given to those private facts which would be highly offensive to a 
person of reasonable sensibilities; and 
3 the publicity results in the plaintiff suffering emotional distress, 
embarrassment or humiliation. 
Thus, the question of whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy is 
crucial to both torts. Whether such an expectation exists will be a question of 
degree, upon which different opinions may validly be expressed on the same 
facts. It will be a decision based on balancing the relevant circumstances of the 
case: a factor that might on its own suggest a low expectation of privacy may be 
outweighed by an additional circumstance (or circumstances) which give an 
entirely different perspective to the matter, and which lead to the conclusion that 
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. A non-exhaustive list of factors that 
may be relevant to this balancing exercise would include: 
• How intimate the facts are, there being a reasonable expectation of privacy 
concerning details of an individual’s health, private behaviour, home life or 
personal or family relationships. ‘Private behaviour … or personal relation-
ships’ may require separate treatment where a sexual relationship is involved. 
There are differing types of liaisons which may have varying levels of 
privacy that might reasonably be expected.276 Thus a high expectation of 
privacy may normally attend a sexual relationship within a marriage or a 
long-term partnership, while a one-night stand with a stranger in a hotel or an 
even more public location might have a very low expectation of privacy. 
• Whether the individual’s family is involved. In particular, if children of a 
vulnerable age are involved then there would generally be a high expectation 
of privacy. 
• The degree to which the particular individual courts publicity generally. 
Those who constantly invite public attention may usually have a lower 
expectation of privacy than those who do not, although this should not be a 
conclusive consideration. 
• The degree to which the individual courted publicity on the relevant 
occasion. A person who only invites public attention on a single occasion 
may normally have a greater expectation of privacy than someone who 
constantly seeks that attention.  
• How directly the individual is associated with an event of public interest. A 
person who is a central figure even unwittingly, may normally have a lower 
expectation of privacy than someone who was merely on the periphery of the 
event. 
 
276 Cf A v B plc [2003] QB 195 and the range suggested in Theakston v MGN Ltd [2002] EMLR 
398, 418 (Ouseley J). 
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• How public the location and attendant circumstances are. A public location is 
normally indicative of a low expectation of privacy, but is by no means 
conclusive. Thus a meeting in a restaurant may, depending on the 
surrounding circumstances, be deemed private. There are many variables that 
may be relevant. Network executives lunching with a personality from a rival 
network at a public eatery may have no concerns that the fact of the 
meeting’s occurance does not stay private, but may be adamant that the 
content of the meeting should remain so. By contrast, a private location such 
as a home almost always will suggest a high expectation of privacy. There 
may also be clear expectations of privacy despite a semi-public setting, such 
as where the individual is in his or her hospital bed, as in Kaye. 
• The means used to obtain the information. Use of surreptitious means may 
normally indicate that the information could not have been obtained 
otherwise, and may therefore be indicative of a high expectation of privacy. 
Use of a recording device may also mean that a normally low expectation of 
privacy, associated with one-off behaviour in a public place in front of 
passers-by and security observers, is transformed into a much higher 
expectation of privacy in relation to a much greater exposure through 
potential replaying of the recording.277 
• Whether there is a risk of serious injury if there is disclosure. As suggested 
above in relation to the Venables case,278 a circumstance where there is a risk 
of serious injury to the individual or other person normally may be an 
example of a circumstance in which there is a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. 
• Whether any public record, which has been or is to be accessed, may be 
considered to be still part of the public consciousness. It has been accepted in 
New Zealand and the United States that simply because information is in a 
public record does not mean it is deemed to be in the public domain.279 
However, it may be difficult to suggest any one fixed time at which 
information in a public record is effectively no longer ‘public’. It is submitted 
that the relevant consideration for the purposes of expectations of privacy 
should be how prominent the information in the record remains in the public 
consciousness. A person who has a ‘skeleton in the closet’ in the form of a 
20-year-old indecency conviction might be regarded as having a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in this respect.280 By contrast, a notorious paedophile 
released from jail after serving a long sentence for his or her crimes would 
only have low expectations of privacy. 
• Any other relevant circumstances. 
 
277 Peck v United Kingdom (2003) I Eur Court HR 123. 
278 See above nn 85–8 and accompanying text. 
279 See, eg, Tucker [1986] 2 NZLR 716, 733 (McGrechan J); Prosser and Keeton, above n 45, 859. 
280 Naturally this expectation might be reduced if there are other considerations, such as the 
individual being a government minister who courts publicity. It might also ultimately be out-
weighed, in an appropriate case, by a countervailing public interest. 
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D  Defences 
As with defamation, the defences for invasion of privacy should be developed 
in order to achieve a balance between the right to privacy and freedom of 
expression. It is likely that the relevant defences, and the balance that they 
achieve, will most prominently reflect the Australian ‘spin’ on privacy, just as the 
expansive meaning of ‘newsworthiness’ shows the importance placed on an 
unabridged freedom of speech in the United States. Australia could choose 
simply to adopt the law of another country, such as balancing an amorphous 
‘public interest’ as in the United States and the United Kingdom, but this will not 
necessarily reflect a law for a distinctly Australian context.281 
Naturally, due to the limitations of the forensic process, the relevant defences 
will be teased out by the cases as the need arises. In the absence of specific 
legislation, a complete set of potential defences is unlikely to emerge until the 
corresponding torts have been more fully developed. 
1 Existing Indicators 
When determining where Australia should draw the line, it is worth noting that 
the exercise has previously been addressed in relation to at least one form of 
privacy in Australia. Every jurisdiction in Australia has legislation prohibiting 
the listening to or recording of private conversations, together with prohibitions 
on communicating or publishing the content of private conversations to third 
parties.282 In some jurisdictions the bans also embrace the visual recording of 
private activities and the communication or publication of the contents.283 
As such, the prohibitions are closely analogous to the proposed torts of unrea-
sonable intrusion and disclosure of private facts.284 That said, any hope for clear 
pointers to appropriate defences would be in vain. Not only is there no uniform-
ity in the defences provided under the statutes, but there are also remarkable 
differences in the various regimes. It is possible, however, to extract defences 
which each enjoy support in, say, four or more of the eight jurisdictions. Leaving 
aside defences related to, for example, warrants and statutory authorities, the 
relevant defences to the intrusive conduct (that is, listening, viewing or re-
cording)285 are: 
 
281 Lenah Game Meats (2001) 208 CLR 199, 328 (Callinan J). 
282 See, eg, Listening Devices Act 1992 (ACT) ss 4–6; Listening Devices Act 1984 (NSW) ss 5–7; 
Surveillance Devices Act 2000 (NT) ss 5–6, 40; Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld) ss 43–5; 
Listening and Surveillance Devices Act 1972 (SA) ss 4–5, 7(3); Listening Devices Act 1991 
(Tas) ss 5, 9–10; Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) ss 6–7, 11; Surveillance Devices Act 1998 
(WA) ss 5–6, 9. 
283 See, eg, Surveillance Devices Act 2000 (NT) ss 5–6, 40; Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) 
ss 6–7, 11; Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA) ss 5–6, 9. 
284 Indeed, Illustration 3 of Second Restatement § 652B (1977) (the intrusion tort) relates to use of a 
listening device to record private conversations, based on Rhodes v Graham, 37 SW 2d 46 
(Ky, 1931). 
285 For these purposes, no distinction is drawn between the situations where the defendant listened 
to, viewed or recorded a conversation or activity to which he or she was a party, and where the 
defendant was a third party to the conversation or activity. 
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• unintentional hearing, viewing or recording as a result of use of the device;286 
• consent;287 and 
• that the conduct was reasonably necessary in the public interest, or there is at 
least a threat of imminent serious injury or property damage.288 
Inasmuch as the unreasonable intrusion tort (as formulated above) requires an 
‘intentional interference’, a defence based on unintentional conduct would seem 
superfluous. 
The relevant defences to communicating or publishing the content of private 
conversations289 are: 
• where the communication or publication is for legal proceedings;290 
• consent;291 
• that the communication was reasonably necessary in the public interest, or 
there is at least a threat of imminent serious injury or property damage;292 
• that the communication was reasonably necessary to protect the defendant’s 
interests;293 
• that the communication was reasonably necessary in performance of the 
defendant’s duty;294 and 
 
286 See, eg, Listening Devices Act 1992 (ACT) s 2(b); Listening Devices Act 1984 (NSW) s 5(2)(d); 
Surveillance Devices Act 2000 (NT) ss 6(b), 7; Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld) s 43(2)(b); 
Listening Devices Act 1991 (Tas) s 5(2)(d); Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA) ss 5(2)(e), 
6(2)(e). 
287 See, eg, Listening Devices Act 1992 (ACT) s 4(3); Listening Devices Act 1984 (NSW) s 5(3); 
Surveillance Devices Act 2000 (NT) s 6(b); Listening and Surveillance Devices Act 1972 (SA) 
s 4; Listening Devices Act 1991 (Tas) s 5; Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA) ss 5(3), 6(3). 
288 See, eg, Listening and Surveillance Devices Act 1972 (SA) s 7; Surveillance Devices Act 1998 
(WA) ss 5(2)(b), 6(3)(b), 28–31. See also Listening Devices Act 1984 (NSW) s 5(2)(c); Listening 
Devices Act 1991 (Tas) s 5(2)(c) (imminent threat of serious injury or property damage). 
289 For these purposes no distinction is drawn between situations where the defendant is a party to 
the conversation or activity, or is a third party. 
290 See, eg, Listening Devices Act 1992 (ACT) s 5(2)(c); Listening Devices Act 1984 (NSW) 
s 7(2)(b); Surveillance Devices Act 2000 (NT) s 40(e)(iv); Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld) 
s 45(2)(b); Listening and Surveillance Devices Act 1972 (SA) s 7(3)(e); Listening Devices Act 
1991 (Tas) s 10(2)(b); Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) s 11(2)(c); Surveillance Devices Act 
1998 (WA) s 9(2). 
291 See, eg, Listening Devices Act 1992 (ACT) ss 5(2)(b), 6(2)(a); Listening Devices Act 1984 
(NSW) ss 6(2)(a), 7(2)(a); Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld) ss 44(2)(a), 45(2)(a); Listening 
and Surveillance Devices Act 1972 (SA) s 7(3)(b); Listening Devices Act 1991 (Tas) ss 9(2)(a), 
10(2)(a); Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) s 11(2)(a); Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA) 
s 9(2)(a). 
292 See, eg, Surveillance Devices Act 2000 (NT) s 40(e)(i); Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld) 
s 45(2)(c); Listening and Surveillance Devices Act 1972 (SA) s 7(3)(c); Surveillance Devices Act 
1999 (Vic) s 11(2)(b); Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA) ss 9(2)–(3). See also Listening De-
vices Act 1984 (NSW) s 6(2)(b); Listening Devices Act 1991 (Tas) s 9(2)(b) (imminent threat of 
serious injury or property damage). 
293 See, eg, Listening Devices Act 1992 (ACT) s 5(2)(d); Listening Devices Act 1984 (NSW) 
s 7(2)(c); Surveillance Devices Act 2000 (NT) s 40(e)(iii); Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld) 
s 45(2)(c); Listening and Surveillance Devices Act 1972 (SA) s 7(3)(d); Listening Devices Act 
1991 (Tas) s 10(2)(c); Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) s 11(2)(b); Surveillance Devices Act 
1998 (WA) ss 9(2)–(3). 
294 See, eg, Surveillance Devices Act 2000 (NT) s 40(e)(ii); Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld) 
s 45(2)(c); Listening and Surveillance Devices Act 1972 (SA) s 7(3)(c); Surveillance Devices Act 
1998 (WA) ss 9(2)–(3). 
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• where the communication is to someone reasonably believed to have such an 
interest in the private conversation as to make the communication reason-
able.295 
There are parallels to be drawn with the United States, the United Kingdom 
and New Zealand, particularly insofar as public interest and consent defences are 
concerned. There may, in addition, be similarities with the United States in 
relation to the other defences. These defences will be addressed in more detail 
below. 
The other existing source that might inform an Australian balance between 
privacy and freedom of expression is the ‘second best’ protection from disclosure 
of private facts provided by the public benefit/public interest requirement for the 
justification defence to defamation in four jurisdictions. This requirement has 
provided a measure of protection from publication of true, but embarrassing 
personal information. ‘Public benefit’ will normally be satisfied where ‘the 
publication discusses or raises for public discussion or information matters 
which are properly of public concern’.296 A contrast is drawn between promoting 
the public good and merely pandering to those who are avid for scandal.297 This 
contrast reflects the distinction drawn by the New Zealand Court of Appeal 
between a matter of legitimate public concern and a matter merely concerning, 
or of interest to, the public. ‘Public interest’ is a term chosen to bring the 
justification defence in line with other areas of defamation law. It has been 
loosely defined as involving matters that are ‘such as to affect people at large, so 
that they may be legitimately interested in, or concerned at, what is going on; or 
what may happen to them or to others.’298 This meaning may serve as a useful 
example of how the notion of public interest may be further delineated when 
applied in the context of privacy. 
2 Private Interest: Consent 
Like any trespass, an interference which is consented to should not result in a 
remedy. Although speaking in terms of balancing public interest against confi-
dentiality, the English courts may be seen as effectively entertaining a consent 
defence when holding that entertainers, who use the media to publicise personal 
information about their marriage,299 or to present a particular image,300 cannot 
then complain when that publicity is not favourable to them. Thus, a participant 
in a so-called ‘reality’ programme who invites cameras into his or her home can 
hardly complain that there has been an intrusion or disclosure in breach of his or 
her privacy. 
An important caveat in the case of consent, however, is that the scope of the 
consent must not be exceeded. Consent for one purpose does not amount to a 
 
295 See, eg, Listening Devices Act 1992 (ACT) s 5(2)(e); Listening Devices Act 1984 (NSW) 
s 7(2)(d); Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld) s 45(2)(d); Listening Devices Act 1991 (Tas) 
s 10(2)(d); Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA) ss 9(2)–(3). 
296 Allworth v John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd (1993) 113 FLR 254, 263 (Higgins J). 
297 Rofe v Smith’s Newspapers Ltd (1924) 25 SR (NSW) 4. 
298 London Artists Ltd v Littler [1969] 2 QB 375, 391 (Lord Denning MR). 
299 Lennon v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1978] FSR 573. 
300 Woodward v Hutchins [1977] 1 WLR 760. 
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voluntary assumption of risk that the publication may serve another purpose. Thus, 
if a footballer allowed a photographer access to the post-match locker room in 
order to take photographs which, subject to editorial control, would be included 
in a charity publication, it should be considered an invasion of privacy without 
an effective consent defence if the photographer takes full frontal shots of the 
footballer and publishes them in a salacious magazine.301 Consent will therefore 
be limited by any express or implied ‘no-go’ zones which restrict its scope. 
3 Public Interest 
The public interest defence is likely to be the most contentious of the defences 
in terms of its appropriate scope. It finds expression in the various jurisdictions 
to different effect. As ‘newsworthiness’ it has enjoyed trump status in the United 
States, at least in relation to public disclosure of private facts. In the United 
Kingdom, freedom of expression has great weight, by virtue of art 10 of the 
ECHR. In New Zealand, Gault P and Blanchard J cast the defence in terms of 
‘legitimate public concern.’302 A number of observations may be offered 
concerning the appropriate scope of this defence for Australia. 
Unlike the constitutional guarantee of free speech in the United States, or the 
prominence afforded to freedom of expression which is now required by the 
HRA, the common law approach to free speech continues to apply in Australia. 
Under the common law, liberty ends where the law begins: citizens are free to do 
what they wish unless there is a law against it.303 A right to free speech is not 
expressly stated in the Australian Constitution and cannot be implied into it. 
However, it was recognised in Lange that the Constitution prescribes a represen-
tative system of government, and that it is essential that there be a freedom of 
communication concerning government or political matters to enable the people 
to make informed decisions when they vote.304 Accordingly, there are two 
questions to be considered when assessing the validity of a law. First, ‘does the 
law effectively burden freedom of communication about government or political 
matters either in its terms, operation or effect?’305 Second, if so, ‘is the law 
reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end, the fulfilment of 
which is compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed 
system of representative and responsible government’?306 
A tort preventing disclosure of private facts would be such a burden, since it 
would protect from revelation aspects of the private life of a politician, public 
official or public commentator which have a bearing on that person’s perform-
ance or public role, especially instances of hypocrisy, falsehood or double  
 
 
 
301 Cf Ettingshausen v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (Unreported, Supreme Court of New South 
Wales, Hunt CJ at CL, 11 March 1993). 
302 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1, 32. 
303 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 564 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, 
Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ) (‘Lange’). 
304 Ibid 560. 
305 Ibid 561–2, 567 (citations omitted). 
306 Ibid. 
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standards of behaviour. For instance, the action could protect from disclosure 
revelations of the sexual improprieties of a politician who was campaigning on a 
strict moral platform.  
The second question, however, is not without difficulty. While privacy may be 
seen as based on personal autonomy, personal autonomy may also be seen as a 
justification for free speech. In other words, the same rationale may be seen as 
both supporting and opposing a right to privacy.307 Moreover, personal autonomy 
may be seen as being promoted by a democratic system such as that prescribed 
by the Constitution. However, it cannot be said that a purely private interest, in 
the form of the human dignity that privacy serves, is an end the fulfilment of 
which is compatible with maintaining the Australian system of government in 
the same way as, for example, a law directed towards public order or safety,308 
fiscal responsibility309 or the administration of justice.310 A defence to the 
disclosure tort should at least be fashioned in the form of publications concern-
ing government or political matters in a similar manner as the High Court 
moulded the means by which defamation laws could be regarded as valid. As 
with defamation, the defence should be seen as a qualified privilege. In other 
words, the occasion for free speech should be judged to be more important than 
the plaintiff’s right to privacy. However, free speech is not absolute and again, 
similarly to defamation, the privilege should be lost if the publication is actuated 
by malice. 
In relation to whether the same defence should apply to the intrusion tort, it 
might be argued that different considerations should apply since it lacks the same 
aspect of widespread publicity. However, when attention is focused on the 
question of whether the effect of the law is to burden the freedom of communica-
tion of government or political matters, a different result may follow. Take again 
the case of a politician’s suspected hypocrisy in pursuing extra-marital sexual 
liaisons whilst campaigning on a strict moral platform. It may well be that the 
investigative journalism employed to obtain the necessary evidence involved 
surreptitious measures that might otherwise be judged as warranting a remedy on 
the grounds of being an unreasonable intrusion. If the implied freedom of 
communication only applied to the disclosure tort, the politician might neverthe-
less be free to quash the story at its source by relying on the unreasonable 
intrusion tort. In other words, although it does not involve widespread publicity, 
it is submitted that the unreasonable intrusion, insofar as it facilitates the later 
disclosure of discovered information, may still be capable of effectively burden-
ing the implied freedom of political communication. In order to serve an end  
 
 
307 See further Phillipson and Fenwick, above n 59, 682. 
308 See, eg, Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579. 
309 See, eg, Registrar of the Western Australian Industrial Relations Commis-
sion v Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied 
Workers Union of Australia, Engineering and Electrical Division WA Branch [1999] WASCA 
170 (Unreported, Kennedy, Anderson and Scott JJ, 9 September 1999). 
310 See, eg, John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Doe (1995) 37 NSWLR 81, 109–11 (Kirby P); Civil 
Aviation Authority v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1995) 39 NSWLR 540, 549, 559–61 
(Kirby P), 570–1 (Handley JA); Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd v Lovell (1998) 19 WAR 316. 
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compatible with the Australian system of government, there would again need to 
be a defence in relation to government or political matters and with no actuating 
malice. 
Such a defence will naturally have a greater or lesser significance depending 
on the meaning given to the term ‘government or political matter’. In Theopha-
nous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd, the joint judgment of Mason CJ, Toohey and 
Gaudron JJ regarded the term as including, but not limited to, the conduct, 
policies or fitness for office of government, political parties, public bodies, 
public officers and candidates, as well as the political views and public conduct 
of persons who are engaged in activities that have become the subject of political 
debate, such as trade union leaders, indigenous political leaders, political and 
economic commentators.311 They also saw the term extending to ‘all speech 
relevant to the development of public opinion on the whole range of issues 
which an intelligent citizen should think about.’312 Since an intelligent citizen 
would presumably wish to think about a wide range of issues, the concept may 
be a particularly broad one. Mason CJ sought to summarise the idea with the 
words ‘public affairs’.313 A distinction may therefore be drawn from the guaran-
tee of free speech in the United States, which also covers other forms of speech 
such as ‘commercial speech’ used by a merchant to advertise his or her wares 
and speech associated with entertainment. 
It must be acknowledged, however, that the Lange defence has since been 
narrowed by a limitation of ‘government or political matters’314 to those of the 
‘electoral and parliamentary sense’,315 such as discussion about political candi-
dates.316 It does not extend generally to matters of public interest,317 nor to 
commercially significant matters.318 Discussion concerning the corporate sector, 
including non-profit organisations, would now seem to be outside the ambit of 
the defence.319 
It is argued, therefore, that in addition to this implied freedom of communica-
tion, however it may be described, the law should maintain the level of free 
speech already afforded under the protection of privacy conferred by the public 
benefit/public interest defence to defamation. In other words, it should be a 
defence to a disclosure of private facts if the publication is in the public interest, 
in the sense of promoting the public good, or is such as to affect people at large 
 
311 (1994) 182 CLR 104, 122–3. 
312 Ibid 124, approving Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech (1985) 152. 
313 Thompson v Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 574, 138–40. 
314 See Andrew T Kenyon, ‘Lange and Reynolds Qualified Privilege: Australian and English 
Defamation Law and Practice’ (2004) 28 Melbourne University Law Review 406, 416. See also 
P H Lane, ‘Constitutional Law: Freedom to Communicate and Criticise’ (2001) 75 Australian 
Law Journal 291; Michael Chesterman, ‘When Is a Communication “Political”?’ (2000) 14(2) 
Legislative Studies 5; Diana Sedgwick, ‘The Implied Freedom of Political Communication: An 
Empty Promise?’ (2003) 7 University of Western Sydney Law Review 35. 
315 Herald & Weekly Times Ltd v Popovic (2003) 9 VR 1, 104 (Warren AJA). 
316 See, eg, Brander v Ryan (2000) 78 SASR 234; Featherston v Tully [No 2] (2002) 83 SASR 347. 
317 See, eg, Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Marsden [2002] NSWCA 419 (Unreported, 
Beazley, Giles and Santow JJA, 24 December 2002) [1160] (Beazley, Giles and Santow JJA). 
318 See, eg, West v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 505 (Unreported, Simpson J, 15 
August 2003). 
319 See, eg, Rowan v Cornwall [No 5] (2002) 82 SASR 152. 
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so that they may be legitimately interested in it or concerned about it. This would 
include matters such as disclosure of crime or wrongdoing, risk to community 
health and/or public safety, and issues related to the environment and education. 
In some respects there may be overlap with the freedom of communication 
concerning electoral or parliamentary affairs. Consistency also requires that a 
similar public interest defence should apply to the unreasonable intrusion tort, 
particularly where the intrusion amounts to an information gathering exercise 
which in turn facilitates a later disclosure of facts. 
This would seem to be a marginally wider result than the public interest de-
fence in Australia to at least the disclosure tort, arrived at via a different route. 
Australia could follow the United Kingdom model of transforming its action for 
breach of confidence as Gleeson CJ suggested in Lenah Game Meats.320 
However, in the absence of the influence of the ECHR, which saw the United 
Kingdom courts replace balancing the ‘public interest’321 with balancing 
‘freedom of expression’, the Australian courts would presumably be left with the 
defence that currently has the support of the weight of authority, namely disclo-
sure of iniquity or other misdeed, or disclosure in order to protect public safety. 
This narrower defence would only embrace disclosure of 
matters, carried out or contemplated, in breach of the country’s security, or in 
breach of law (including statutory duty), fraud or otherwise destructive of the 
country or its people, including matters medically dangerous to the public; and 
doubtless other misdeeds of similar gravity.322 
It would not include matters that would have been covered by the ‘public 
interest’ test previously applied in the United Kingdom, such as disclosure of 
hypocrisy by those in the public eye who might otherwise be role models,323 or 
even the public interest test advocated above, which would also include matters 
of public concern such as environmental issues. 
Whatever the appropriate scope of ‘public interest’, there is no doubt that a 
distinction is to be drawn with matters of mere interest to the public. In New 
Zealand, this was reflected in Hosking by Gault P and Blanchard J’s deliberate 
use of the term ‘public concern’, which was intended to exclude information 
which is merely of interest to the public. In several of the Listening Devices Acts 
the reference is phrased as being ‘no more than reasonably necessary’ in the 
public interest.324 Accordingly, a photograph of the home of the winner of first 
prize in a lottery jackpot would be no more than curiosity to the public, rather 
than being in the public interest, and therefore would fall outside the ambit of a 
public interest defence. Similarly, much regarding the private life of a public 
figure will only be something of passing interest to the public, so that if such a 
 
320 (2001) 208 CLR 199, 225. 
321 See, eg, Woodward v Hutchins [1977] 1 WLR 760. 
322 Beloff v Pressdram Ltd [1973] 1 All ER 241, 260 (Ungoed-Thomas J), approved in Castrol 
Australia Pty Ltd v Emtech Associates Pty Ltd (1980) 33 ALR 31, 55 (Rath J). 
323 See, eg, Woodward v Hutchins [1977] 1 WLR 760. 
324 See, eg, Surveillance Devices Act 2000 (NT) s 40(e)(i); Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld) 
s 45(2)(c); Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) s 11(2)(b); Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA) 
ss 9(2)-(3); cf Listening and Surveillance Devices Act 1972 (SA) s 7(3)(c). 
   
M.U.L.R. — Author — printed 19/09/2005 at 6:14 PM — page 384 of 51
  
384 Melbourne University Law Review  [Vol 29 
     
person can show a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances, the 
publication would not attract a public interest defence. In this respect, the 
publisher’s interest in perhaps an increase in audience share should not be 
confused with the public interest. 
Further, if the constitutional freedom of communication is regarded as a quali-
fied privilege, then the privilege may be lost in the case of a widespread disclo-
sure if the publication is not reasonable. In the defamation context, it has been 
held that the privilege normally only protects occasions where the publication 
was to a limited number of recipients.325 Although defamatory material may be 
false, whereas information disclosed in breach of privacy will be true, it is 
correct to say that the damage that could be done when there are thousands of 
recipients of a communication is obviously much greater than when there are 
only a few recipients. For that reason, a requirement of reasonableness may be 
considered to be just as sensibly appropriate and adapted to the protection of 
privacy as it is to the protection of reputation. A similar restraint is indicated for 
any other public interest defence, where the publication should be ‘no more than 
reasonably necessary’. Thus, a person who is injured, ill or in a distressed state in 
a car accident might be regarded as having a prima facie claim to privacy in 
terms of both the intrusion of being filmed and the disclosure when the film is 
broadcast.326 It might nevertheless be argued that there is a countervailing public 
interest in, for example, contributing to the public debate concerning govern-
ment policy relating to roads or increasing public awareness of accidents and 
their tragic aftermaths as a means of deterring poor driving habits. However, 
whether the public interest has been sufficiently served may depend on the detail 
used. Close-up shots of distressed faces would go beyond that which was 
reasonably necessary or would exceed a reasonable extent, and would not be 
covered by the defence. In such cases express or implied consent would be 
needed before the defendant could publish with impunity.327 
Accordingly, when delineating whether there is a relevant public interest in 
Australia, the factors that might be considered include: 
 
325 Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 570 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow 
and Kirby JJ). 
326 See ALRC, Unfair Publication, above n 152, 125, noting that American courts would grant a 
remedy in such a case. 
327 This may raise the issue of the appropriate degree of judicial oversight of editorial decisions. In 
Campbell [2004] 2 AC 457, for example, differing views were expressed. Lords Nicholls and 
Hoffmann in particular emphasised the importance of allowing a proper degree of journalistic 
margin to the press to deal with a legitimate story in its own way, without imposing unnecessary 
shackles on the press’ freedom to publish detail and photographs which add colour and convic-
tion: at 468 and 475 respectively. By contrast, Lord Hope held that while the choice of language 
used to convey information and ideas, and decisions as to whether or not to accompany the 
printed word by the use of photographs, were pre-eminently editorial matters with which the 
court would not interfere, decisions about the publication of material that is private to the indi-
vidual raise issues that are not simply about presentation and editing and were therefore open to 
review by the court: at 489. In addition, Baroness Hale thought the trial judge was best placed to 
judge whether the additional information and the photographs had added significantly both to 
the distress and the potential harm; to tell how serious an interference with press freedom it 
would have been to publish the essential parts of the story without the additional material; as 
well as how difficult a decision this would have been for an editor who had been told that it was, 
say, a medical matter and that it would be morally wrong to publish the material: at 502. Lord 
Carswell agreed with Lord Hope and Baroness Hale: at 505. 
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• Whether the subject matter of any story concerns government or political 
matters. This term could be defined narrowly, in accordance with the current 
approach to the Lange defence. However, for these purposes the broader 
interpretation, that is ‘public affairs’, may be preferable. This would not only 
include speech relevant to factors such as politicians, policy, public bodies 
and public officers but also all speech relevant to the development of public 
opinion on the range of issues which an intelligent citizen should think about. 
• Whether the defendant is otherwise acting or publishing in the public interest, 
that is, the matter concerned affects people at large, so that they may be le-
gitimately interested, or concerned about it. 
• In the case of the disclosure of private facts, the publication must be reason-
able in the circumstances. In the case of both torts the defendant must not be 
actuated by malice or abuse the privilege. 
• The subject matter must be in the public interest rather than merely of interest 
to the public, such as pandering to a desire for scandal. 
4 Other Defences 
The United States experience and the limited experience in Australia in strik-
ing a balance in the context of claims for a form of privacy suggests that there 
may be a place for other subsidiary defences which may have significance in a 
more limited number of cases. However, in the absence of privacy legislation, 
unless a case arises that is on point, it may take some time before the claimed 
defence receives consideration, as shown in Grosse. 
The additional defences under the Second Restatement have parallels with 
defences under Australian defamation law, as shown in the following summary: 
Table 1: Subsidiary Defences in the United States and Australia 
United States — Second 
Restatement 
Australian Equivalent Australian Listening 
Devices Acts Equivalent 
Legislative privilege Parliamentary privilege  
Judicial privilege Judicial privilege  
Conditional privilege: 
reports of public proceed-
ings 
Qualified privilege: fair and 
accurate reports (Parlia-
ment, courts, public 
meetings etc) 
 
Conditional privilege: 
executive officers perform-
ing official duties 
Absolute privilege: 
executive officer communi-
cations 
 
Conditional privilege: 
protection of defendant’s 
interests 
Qualified privilege: 
protection of interest 
(retort) 
No more than reasonably 
necessary to protect 
defendant’s interests 
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Conditional privilege: 
report to government 
authorities concerning 
mental health 
Qualified privilege: limited 
audience with interest in 
truth 
Communication to one 
reasonably believed to have 
an interest such that 
communication is reason-
able 
Conditional privilege: 
reasonable investigation of 
claim against defendant 
Qualified privilege: limited 
audience with interest in 
truth 
Communication to one 
reasonably believed to have 
an interest such that 
communication is reason-
able 
 
In the case of parliamentary and judicial proceedings, an unabridged freedom 
of speech is considered indispensable to the effective functioning of the institu-
tion.328 This is reflected in the conferral of absolute immunity from suit for 
defamation.329 There is no reason why privacy should not similarly defer to 
freedom of speech. Freedom of speech in such proceedings could clearly be 
hindered if privacy is protected from public disclosure. However, it could also be 
restricted where the information has been surreptitiously obtained through an 
unreasonable intrusion if the plaintiff elected to forego the action based on public 
disclosure but sought a remedy for the intrusion. Therefore, the defence should 
apply to both proposed torts. 
Fair and accurate reporting both relate to the publication of information. Public 
interest supports a qualified privilege against defamation proceedings on a 
number of grounds, such as an extension of proceedings generally open to 
attendance by members of the public, the public scrutiny of public officials 
conducting the proceedings, education of the public, and forestalling the circula-
tion of unfounded rumours.330 These grounds are considered sufficient for the 
privilege to override an individual’s reputation, and should also override an 
individual’s right to privacy in the form of protection from widespread disclosure 
of private details. 
There is no exact match for the ‘executive officers performing official func-
tions’ defence of the United States. The common law does recognise that 
communications by high-level officers in their official capacity are in the nature 
of acts of state, and therefore protected by absolute privilege.331 The precise  
 
 
 
328 Gibbons v Duffell (1932) 47 CLR 520, 528 (Gavan Duffy CJ, Rich and Dixon JJ). 
329 In relation to parliamentary proceedings, see Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Cth) s 16(1); 
Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 1988 (Cth) s 24(3); Imperial Acts Applica-
tion Act 1969 (NSW) s 6; Legislative Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Act 1992 (NT) ss 4, 6; 
Defamation Act 1889 (Qld) s 10(1); Constitution Act 1934 (SA) s 38; Defamation Act 1957 (Tas) 
s 10(1); Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) s 19(1); Parliamentary Privileges Act 1891 (WA) s 1. In 
relation to judicial proceedings see, eg, Defamation Act 1889 (Qld) s 11; Defamation Act 1957 
(Tas) s 11; Cabassi v Vila (1940) 64 CLR 130. 
330 Webb v Times Publishing Co Ltd [1960] 2 QB 535, 559–62 (Pearson J). 
331 Chatterton v Secretary of State for India in Council [1895] 2 QB 189, 191 (Lord Esher MR). 
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scope of this defence is uncertain,332 but would seem to be limited to communi-
cations between government ministers and other ministers or high-level offi-
cials.333  
Protection of self-interest is well-supported as a likely defence. If allegations 
are made against a person, he or she should be entitled to defend himself or 
herself without one hand being tied behind their back by the spectre of a breach 
of privacy claim by either the accuser or a third party. Moderation of this 
privilege rests in it being ‘qualified’ or ‘conditional’, as it is described in the 
United States, or in the formulation of the defence as ‘no further than reasonably 
necessary’ to protect the defendant’s interests.334 The defence should therefore be 
unavailable in the event that the intrusion or disclosure was actuated by malice 
or ill will. 
The privilege attracted by a report to authorities about the plaintiff’s mental 
health is based on the proposition that the restraint and treatment of persons who 
are mentally ill is a matter of public concern.335 Further, the communication in 
such a case is to amount ‘only to the making of a complaint to an officer 
interested in the subject of the complaint and who is authorised to take proper 
steps to investigate the matter’.336 Neither this defence nor ‘reasonable investiga-
tions of claims against the defendant’ have direct parallels in the Australian 
common law, but may be seen as instances of the wider ‘duty/interest’ qualified 
privilege, which embraces cases where the common convenience and welfare of 
society is deemed more important than an individual’s reputation, or in the 
current context, the right to privacy. It is interesting to note that these defences 
could reflect the more generally drawn defence under the Listening Devices Acts 
of ‘communications to [one who is reasonably believed] to have such an interest 
in the private conversation as to make the communication reasonable under the 
circumstances in which it was made.’337 This defence bears a close resemblance 
to the defence to defamation provided by s 22 of the Defamation Act 1974 
(NSW). Under this section, there is a defence for the publication of information 
on a subject to a recipient who has an interest in the information where the 
conduct in publishing the material is reasonable in the circumstances. This 
defence has been considered sufficiently wide to accommodate even the implied 
freedom of communication concerning government or political matters,338 
although the requirement of reasonableness has made it difficult for media 
defendants to rely on this defence.339 Although there may be some attraction in 
also recognising a more widely-drawn defence applying to invasion of privacy at 
 
332 Michael Gillooly, The Law of Defamation in Australia and New Zealand (1998) 156. 
333 Cf Gibbons v Duffell (1932) 47 CLR 520, 526–8 (Gavan Duffy CJ, Rich and Dixon JJ) 
(communication from a police inspector to a superior was not covered). 
334 See above n 324 and accompanying text. 
335 Schwartz v Thiele, 242 Cal App 2d 799, 805 (Frampton J) (Dist Ct App, 1966). 
336 Ibid 804. 
337 See, eg, Listening Devices Act 1992 (ACT) s 5(2)(e); Listening Devices Act 1984 (NSW) 
s 7(2)(d); Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld) s 45(2)(d); Listening Devices Act 1991 (Tas) 
s 10(2)(d); Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA) ss 9(2)–(3). 
338 Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520. 
339 Gillooly, above n 332, 202. Now, a checklist of considerations is provided in Defamation Act 
1974 (NSW) s 22(2A). 
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least in the case of disclosure of private facts, such recognition would more 
likely come by way of statute. A defence recognised by common law is likely to 
be more narrowly formulated, in accordance with the particular needs of the case 
at hand. 
VI  CONCLUSION 
Now that the High Court has cleared the way for Australia to recognise a form 
or forms of protection against invasion of personal privacy, the threshold 
question will be whether there is great enough need for such a tort or torts in this 
country. The fact that other common law countries have taken this step is 
persuasive, but not conclusive, as to whether Australia should do likewise. 
If Australia does choose to follow this path, it is only natural to seek guidance 
from overseas experience, with the caveat that this experience might be closely 
linked to broader regimes or contexts that do not apply here. The United States 
and its century-long experience with torts protecting personal privacy provides 
obvious guidance, but does so in the context of a constitutional guarantee of free 
speech. The United Kingdom and New Zealand courts have provided differing 
paradigms for developing the common law to recognise tortious actions protect-
ing privacy, although in the case of the United Kingdom this was done under the 
influence of the HRA and the ECHR. 
It has been suggested that there is a case for recognising two separate privacy 
torts: one protecting against unreasonable intrusion and the other protecting 
against disclosure of private facts. The first has been described as the ‘arche-
typal’ form of invasion of privacy, and its recognition should be seen as subsum-
ing the developing tort of harassment, which should be regarded as merely an 
instance of the wider tort. The second is a tort which has been recognised in all 
three of the other common law countries, the United States model being adopted 
in New Zealand and the United Kingdom by way of transforming the equitable 
action for breach of confidence. It has been noted that an essential catalyst for 
the United Kingdom development was the influence of the HRA. In the absence 
of the booster effect of a similar statute in Australia, it is submitted that this 
country should not follow a similar course of contorting an equitable doctrine 
based on good conscience into a tort based on human dignity and personal 
autonomy and yielding a remedy of substantive damages. Instead, a preferable 
course is to adopt and adapt the United States model, with the two torts consis-
tent in being based on a judgement of whether there is a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the circumstances. This should be a decision balancing relevant 
factors including the setting, means of invasion and degree to which the plaintiff 
courted publicity. Once this balancing exercise is concluded, a judgement should 
be made as to whether the relevant invasion of privacy would be highly offensive 
to a person of ordinary sensitivities as a guard against trivial claims. This is an 
important means of excluding trivial cases in light of the fact that the relevant 
damage being compensated is in the nature of mere emotional distress, embar-
rassment and humiliation. 
Unlike, for example, the balancing exercise between reasonable expectations 
of privacy and freedom of expression undertaken in the United Kingdom under 
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the influence of the HRA and the ECHR, the question in Australia should then be 
whether there is a relevant defence that will enable the defendant to invade the 
plaintiff’s privacy with impunity. Taking guidance from both past experience in 
Australia and overseas, it is suggested that defences including consent, public 
interest (including accommodation of the constitutional freedom of communica-
tion concerning government or political matters, but also extending to matters of 
public concern) and some subsidiary defences will strike a fair balance between 
an individual’s right to privacy and freedom of expression which is, as Callinan J 
has advocated, adapted to suit Australian conditions.340 
 
340 Lenah Game Meats (2001) 208 CLR 199, 328. 
